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Samenloop van sancties. Fiscale boete en vrij-
heidsstraf wegens dezelfde vergrijpen. Nauw 
verband tussen bestuursrechtelijke en straf-
rechtelijke procedure. Ne bis in idem. Geen 
schending art. 4 Protocol 7 EVRM. Ruimte 
voor strafrechtelijke naast bestuursrechtelij-
ke bestraffende sanctie.
Klagers, A en B, maakten zich beiden schuldig aan 
het niet doorgeven aan de Noorse fiscus van de ver-
koopwinst op hun aandelen. De Noorse belasting-
dienst legde beide klagers naast een navordering 
van de verschuldigde belasting over eerdere jaren 
ook een fiscale boete op, waartegen klagers niet in 
beroep gingen. Nadat het besluit onherroepelijk 
was geworden, klaagde het Openbaar Ministerie A 
en B aan wegens ernstige belastingfraude. De straf-
rechter veroordeelde hen ieder tot een jaar gevan-
genisstraf, ermee rekening houdend dat klagers al 
een belastingboete hadden gekregen. In hoger be-
roep en cassatie bleef dit oordeel in stand.
Klagers dienen in 2011 klachten in tegen Noor-
wegen bij het EHRM en stellen dat het opleggen van 
de fiscale boete door de Noorse Belastingdienst en 
de daaropvolgende veroordeling en strafoplegging 
door de strafrechter wegens dezelfde vergrijpen 
— belastingfraude — in strijd komt met het verbod 
van bis in idem, zoals gegarandeerd door art. 4 Ze-
vende Protocol. 
Het Hof maakt duidelijk dat voor de eerste set 
van procedures (de belastingboete van 30%) de be-
kende Engel-criteria (om te bepalen of sprake is van 
een criminal charge in de zin van art. 6 lid 1 EVRM) 
leidend zijn om uit te maken of deze procedures ook 
“criminal” zijn in de zin van art. 4 Zevende Protocol. 
Het Hof volgt het oordeel van de nationale rechter 
dat hiervan sprake is in het onderhavige geval. 
Het Hof bepaalt dat staten gelegitimeerd moe-
ten kunnen kiezen voor complementaire juridische 
reacties op sociaal onwenselijk gedrag via verschil-
lende procedures die samen een coherent geheel 
vormen en gericht zijn op verschillende aspecten 
van het maatschappelijke probleem in kwestie, 
mits dit geen onevenredige last oplevert voor be-
trokkene. Het is de taak van het Hof om in specifie-
ke gevallen te bepalen of de in het geding zijnde na-
tionale maatregel een ‘double jeopardy’ oplevert 
voor betrokkene of dat het gaat om het resultaat 
van een geïntegreerd systeem dat het mogelijk 
maakt dat verschillende aspecten van een overtre-
ding op een voorzienbare en proportionele wijze 
kunnen worden geadresseerd. 
Volgens het Hof kan het niet het effect zijn van art. 
4 Zevende Protocol dat dit verdragsstaten verbiedt om 
hun rechtssysteem zo in te richten dat er wordt voor-
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zien in de oplegging van een standaard bestuurlijke 
boete wegens ten onrechte niet betaalde belasting 
(hoewel deze sanctie kwalificeert als “criminal” voor 
de verdragsrechtelijke eisen van een eerlijk proces) en 
om daarnaast in de ernstigere zaken, waar dit pas-
send is, de overtreder tevens strafrechtelijk te vervol-
gen voor een additioneel element bij de niet-betaling, 
zoals frauduleus handelen, dat niet geadresseerd is in 
de “bestuurlijke” terugvorderingsprocedure en de 
daarmee samenhangende boete.
Om het Hof te overtuigen dat geen sprake is van 
dubbeling (“duplication”) van berechting of straf 
zoals verboden in art. 4 Zevende Protocol moet de 
aangesproken staat overtuigend aantonen dat de 
dubbele procedures in kwestie een voldoende nau-
we samenhang hebben, zowel inhoudelijk als tem-
poreel (“sufficiently closely connected in substance 
and in time”). De procedures moeten, met andere 
woorden, op een geïntegreerde wijze worden ge-
combineerd, zodat zij een coherent geheel vormen. 
Dit impliceert niet alleen dat de nagestreefde doe-
len en de gebruikte middelen in essentie comple-
mentair zijn en gelinkt in tijd, maar ook dat de mo-
gelijke gevolgen van deze procedures proportioneel 
en voorzienbaar zijn voor de geadresseerde perso-
nen. Het Hof geeft een opsomming van verschillen-
de materiële factoren om te bepalen of er een vol-
doende nauwe inhoudelijk verband bestaat. Verder 
overweegt het Hof dat de mate waarin de bestuur-
lijke procedure de kenmerken heeft van een gewo-
ne strafrechtelijke procedure een belangrijke factor 
is. Als de procedure in kwestie niet de kenmerken 
heeft van “hard core criminal law” is er mogelijk 
eerder aanleiding te concluderen dat de dubbeling 
van procedures voor de betrokken persoon geen 
onevenredige last oplevert.
Naast de eis van een voldoende inhoudelijk ver-
band tussen de verschillende procedures, geldt de 
eis van een voldoende temporele band. Dit betekent 
niet dat beide procedures van begin tot eind gelijk-
tijdig moeten worden gevoerd. Tegelijkertijd moet 
de connectie in tijd er wel altijd zijn. Zij moet vol-
doende nauw zijn om betrokkene te behoeden voor 
onzekerheid. Hoe zwakker het verband in tijd is, 
hoe zwaarder de bewijslast voor de staat is om deze 
vertraging uit te leggen en te rechtvaardigen.
Het Hof is van oordeel dat er in casu een vol-
doende inhoudelijk en temporeel verband bestaat 
tussen de bestuursrechtelijke (belastingboete) en 
strafrechtelijke (de oplegging van een jaar gevange-
nisstraf) procedure, om ze te beschouwen als twee 
onderdelen van één systeem en er geen sprake is 
van twee afzonderlijke procedures. 
Het Hof is met zestien stemmen tegen één van 
oordeel dat art. 4 Zevende Protocol niet geschonden 
is. 
A en B, 
tegen
Noorwegen.
The law
Alleged violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to 
the Convention
53. The applicants submitted that, in breach 
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, they had been both 
prosecuted and punished twice in respect of the 
same offence under section 12-1 of chapter 12 of 
the Tax Assessment Act, in that they had been 
charged and indicted by the public prosecutor, 
had then had tax penalties imposed on them by 
the tax authorities, which they had paid, and had 
thereafter been convicted and sentenced by the 
criminal courts. Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 reads:
“1. No one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again in criminal proceedings under 
the jurisdiction of the same State for an offen-
ce for which he has already been finally ac-
quitted or convicted in accordance with the 
law and penal procedure of that State.
2. The provisions of the preceding para-
graph shall not prevent the reopening of the 
case in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of the State concerned, if there is 
evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or 
if there has been a fundamental defect in the 
previous proceedings, which could affect the 
outcome of the case.
3. No derogation from this Article shall 
be made under Article 15 of the Convention.”
54. The Government contested that argu-
ment.
A. Admissibility
55. In the Court's view the applications raise 
complex issues of fact and Convention law, such 
that they cannot be rejected on the ground of 
being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning 
of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. Neither are 
they inadmissible on any other grounds. They 
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The applicants
56. The applicants argued that, in breach of 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, they had been subjec-
ted to double jeopardy on account of the same 
matter, namely an offence under section 12-1(1) 
of the Tax Assessment Act, having been first accu-
sed and indicted by the prosecution services and 
having had tax penalties imposed on them by the 
tax authorities, which they had both accepted 
and paid, before being criminally convicted. Re-
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ferring to the chronology of the proceedings 
complained of, the first applicant added that he 
had been prosecuted twice over a long period, 
which had exposed him to an unreasonably he-
avy burden, both physically and psychologically, 
leading to a heart attack and hospitalisation.
(a) Whether the first proceedings were crimi-
nal in nature
57. Agreeing with the Supreme court's ana-
lysis on the basis of the Engel criteria and other 
relevant national case-law concerning tax penal-
ties at the ordinary 30% level, the applicants 
found it obvious that the tax penalty proceedings, 
not only the tax fraud proceedings, were of a ‘cri-
minal’ nature and that both sets of proceedings 
were to be regarded as ‘criminal’ for the purpose 
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
(b) Whether the offences were the same 
(idem)
58. The applicants further shared the view 
expressed by the Supreme court that there was 
no doubt that the factual circumstances under-
lying the decision to impose tax penalties and the 
criminal prosecution had sufficient common fea-
tures to be regarded as the same offence. In both 
instances, the factual basis was the omission to 
declare income on the tax return.
(c) Whether and when a final decision had 
been taken in the tax proceedings
59. In the applicants’ submission, the tax au-
thorities' decision to impose the tax penalties had 
become final with the force of res judicata on 15 
December 2008 in the case of the first applicant 
and on 26 December 2008 in the case of the se-
cond applicant, that is, before the District court 
had convicted them in respect of the same con-
duct, on 2 March 2009 in the case of the first ap-
plicant and on 30 September 2009 in the case of 
the second applicant. No matter whether these 
sanctions were to be regarded as so-called paral-
lel proceedings, the tax penalty decisions against 
the applicants had become final and had gained 
legal force before the applicants were convicted 
for exactly the same conduct by the Follo District 
court and the Oslo city court, respectively. Sub-
jecting them to criminal punishment accordingly 
violated the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
(d) Whether there was duplication of procee-
dings (bis)
60. The applicants argued that they had 
been victims of duplication of proceedings such 
as was proscribed by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 
Since the administrative proceedings relating to 
the tax penalties had indeed been of a criminal 
nature, the prosecution authorities were obliged 
under Article 4 of the Protocol to discontinue the 
criminal proceedings as soon as the outcome of 
the administrative set had become final. Howe-
ver, they had failed to do so.
61. In the applicants' submission, whilst pa-
rallel proceedings were permissible under Nor-
wegian law, the domestic authorities' use of this 
avenue had made it possible for them to coordi-
nate their procedures and circumvent the prohi-
bition in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and thus make 
the protection of that provision illusory. In the 
case of the first applicant, in particular, the use of 
the parallel proceedings model seemed to have 
been coordinated as a joint venture organised by 
prosecutors in cooperation with the tax authori-
ties.
62. In the present case the prosecutors had 
simply waited until the tax authorities had deci-
ded to impose tax penalties before referring the 
related case for trial. criminal and administrative 
proceedings had thus been coordinated, with the 
aim of trapping the applicants by means of two 
different sets of criminal provisions so as to im-
pose on them additional tax and tax penalties 
and have them convicted for the same conduct, in 
other words double jeopardy. From the point of 
view of legal security, the possibility of conduc-
ting parallel proceedings was problematic. The 
strong underlying aim of this provision of the 
Protocol in protecting individuals against being 
forced to bear an excessive burden suggested that 
the possibilities for the authorities to pursue pa-
rallel proceedings ought to be limited.
63. From a due-process prospective, this op-
tion of concerted efforts between the administra-
tive and prosecution authorities to prepare the 
conduct of parallel proceedings was contrary to 
the prohibition against double jeopardy in Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7 and the court’s recent case-
law as well as some national case-law. conse-
quently, this option allowing for parallel procee-
dings arranged between different authorities in 
the present case was questionable and failed to 
take due account of the strain on the applicants 
and the main interest behind Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7.
64. During their ‘nightmare’ experience in this 
case, so the applicants claimed, they had 
experienced great relief when the first applicant 
was called by the tax officer who stated that he 
could now ‘breathe a sigh of relief’ because of new 
written guidelines from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, dated 3 April 2009, which banned 
double prosecution and double jeopardy, as in his 
case. With reference to Zolotukhin, these guidelines 
provided, inter alia, that at an appellate hearing, 
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whether the lower court had decided on conviction 
or acquittal, the prosecutor should request that the 
judgment be set aside and the case be dismissed. 
By virtue of these new guidelines from the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the fact that a tax 
penalty was classified as punishment, and because 
the decision on the tax penalty had become final 
and res judicata for the applicants, they reasonably 
expected that the penal proceedings against them 
would be discontinued on account of the 
prohibition against double jeopardy in Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7. Besides, pursuant to the same new 
guidelines, other defendants who had been 
charged with the same offences in the same case-
complex had not had tax penalties imposed on 
them, because they had already been convicted 
and sentenced to imprisonment for violation of 
section 12-2 of the Tax Assessment Act. The 
applicants, however, unlike the other defendants in 
the same case-complex, had been convicted and 
sentenced to imprisonment despite having had 
additional tax and a tax penalty imposed on them 
in respect of the same conduct. The Government's 
argument that an important consideration was the 
need to ensure equality of treatment with other 
persons involved in the same tax fraud was thus 
unconvincing.
65. According to the applicants, they had 
been psychologically affected even more when, 
notwithstanding the above guidelines, the 
prosecutors continued the matter by invoking 
legal parallel proceedings and denied the 
applicants' request that their conviction by the 
District courts be expunged and the criminal case 
against them be dismissed by the courts. In this 
connection the first applicant produced various 
medical certificates, including from a clinic for 
heart surgery.
2. The Government
66. The Government invited the Grand 
chamber to confirm the approach taken in a 
series of cases predating the Zolotukhin judgment, 
namely that a wider range of factors than the 
Engel criteria (formulated with reference to Article 
6) were relevant for the assessment of whether a 
sanction was ‘criminal’ for the purposes of Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7. They contended that regard 
ought to be had to such factors as the legal 
classification of the offence under national law; 
the nature of the offence; the national legal 
characterisation of the sanction; its purpose, 
nature and degree of severity; whether the 
sanction was imposed following conviction for a 
criminal offence; and the procedures involved in 
the adoption and implementation of the sanction 
(they referred to Malige/France, 23 September 
1998, § 35, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1998-VII; Nilsson/Sweden (dec.), no. 73661/01, 
EcHR 2005-XIII; Haarvig/Norway (dec.), 11187/05, 
11 December 2007; Storbråten/Norway (dec.), 
12277/04, 1 February 2007; and Mjelde/Norway 
(dec.), 11143/04, 1 February 2007).
67. The Government maintained, inter alia, 
that the different wording and object of the 
provisions clearly suggested that the notion of 
‘criminal proceedings’ under Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7 was narrower than the use of ‘criminal’ 
under Article 6. It transpired from the Explanatory 
Report in respect of Protocol No. 7 that the 
wording of Article 4 had been intended for 
criminal proceedings stricto sensu. In paragraph 
28 of that report it was stated that it did not seem 
necessary to qualify the term offence as ‘criminal’, 
since the provision ‘already contain[ed] the terms 
‘in criminal proceedings’ and ‘penal procedure’ 
which render[ed] unnecessary any further 
specification in the text of the article itself’. In 
paragraph 32 it was stressed that Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 did not prohibit proceedings ‘of a 
different character (for example, disciplinary 
action in the case of an official)’. Moreover, Article 
6 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 safeguarded 
different, and at times opposite, aims. Article 6 
was aimed at promoting procedural safeguards 
in criminal proceedings.
68. The Government also pointed to a 
number of further differences in regard to the 
manner in which the two provisions had been 
interpreted and applied in the court's case-law, 
including the absolute character of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 (non-derogable under Article 15) 
as opposed to the differentiated approach which 
the court applied under Article 6. They referred 
to Jussila /Finland ([Gc], 73053/01, § 43, EcHR 
2006-XIV), where the Grand chamber had stated 
that there were ‘clearly ‘criminal charges’ of 
differing weight’ and that ‘[t]ax surcharges 
differ[ed] from the hard core of criminal law’ such 
that ‘the criminal-head guarantees w[ould] not 
necessarily apply with their full stringency’.
69. Relying on the wider range of criteria, the 
Government invited the court to hold that 
ordinary tax penalties were not ‘criminal’ under 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
70. However, were the Grand chamber to 
follow the other approach, based solely on the 
Engel criteria, and to find that the decision on 
ordinary tax penalties was ‘criminal’ within the 
autonomous meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 
7, they argued as follows.
(b) Whether the offences were the same 
(idem)
71. Agreeing with the reasoning and 
conclusions of the Supreme court in the case of 
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the first applicant (see paragraphs 20 to 30 
above), which the High court followed in that of 
the second applicant (see paragraph 37 above), 
the Government accepted that the factual 
circumstances pertaining to the tax penalties and 
to the tax fraud cases involved the same 
defendants and were inextricably linked together 
in time and space.
(c) Whether a final decision had been taken 
in the tax proceedings
The Supreme court had concluded, out of 
consideration for effective protection and clear 
guidelines, that the tax assessment decision 
became final upon expiry of the three-week 
time-limit for lodging an administrative appeal 
(15 and 26 December 2008 for the first and 
second applicants respectively), even though the 
six-month time-limit for instituting judicial 
proceedings pursuant to the Tax Assessment Act, 
section 11-1(4), had not yet expired. While this 
was hardly a decisive point in the applicants' 
cases (the time-limit for legal proceedings also 
expired before the ongoing criminal proceedings 
came to an end — on 24 May and 5 June 2009 for 
the first and second applicants respectively), the 
Government nonetheless queried whether 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 required an 
interpretation in this stricter sense. It seemed 
well supported by the court's case-law that ‘[d]
ecisions against which an ordinary appeal [lay] 
[were] excluded from the scope of the guarantee 
contained in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 as long as 
the time-limit for lodging such an appeal ha[d] 
not expired’ (they referred to Zolotukhin, cited 
above, § 108). Ordinary remedies through legal 
proceedings were still available to the applicants 
for a period of six months from the date of the 
decision.
(d) Whether there was duplication of 
proceedings (bis)
On the other hand, the Government, still relying 
on the Supreme court's analysis, stressed that 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 under certain 
circumstances allowed for so-called ‘parallel 
proceedings’. The wording of this provision 
clearly indicated that it prohibited the repetition 
of proceedings after the decision in the first 
proceedings had acquired legal force (‘tried or 
punished again … for which he has already been 
finally acquitted or convicted’). The Explanatory 
Report in respect of Protocol No. 7 confirmed that 
the ne bis in idem rule was to be construed 
relatively narrowly. This was reflected in 
Zolotukhin (cited above, § 83), where the Grand 
chamber had refined the scope of the provision, 
limiting it to the following situation:
“The guarantee enshrined in Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 becomes relevant on 
commencement of a new prosecution, where 
a prior acquittal or conviction has already 
acquired the force of res judicata.”
74. This implied a contrario that parallel 
proceedings — different sanctions imposed by 
two different authorities in different proceedings 
closely connected in substance and in time — fell 
outside the scope of the provision. Such parallel 
proceedings would not constitute the 
commencement of a new prosecution where a 
prior acquittal or conviction had already acquired 
the force of res judicata. R.T./Switzerland and 
Nilsson/Sweden (both cited above) clarified the 
circumstances in which proceedings might be 
considered parallel and hence permissible under 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
75. Nonetheless, on the Government's 
analysis, the Zolotukhin approach had been 
departed from in a number of more recent 
judgments, notably in four judgments against 
Finland delivered on 20 May 2014 (they referred 
in particular to Nykänen/Finland,11828/11, § 48 
and Glantz v. Finland, 37394/11, § 57), in which 
paragraph 83 of Zolotukhin had merely been 
taken as a point of departure, with the statement 
that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 ‘clearly prohibits 
consecutive proceedings if the first set of 
proceedings has already become final at the 
moment when the second set of proceedings is 
initiated (see for example Sergey Zolotukhin/
Russia [Gc], cited above)’.
76. In the Government's view, this expansive 
interpretation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 in 
Nykänen (amongst others), which seemed 
incompatible with Zolotukhin, appeared to 
presuppose that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 called 
for the discontinuance of criminal proceedings 
when concurrent administrative proceedings 
became final, or vice versa. It had been based on 
one admissibility decision (Zigarella/Italy (dec.), 
48154/99, EcHR 2002-IX (extracts)) and two 
chamber judgments (Tomasovic/Croatia, 
53785/09, 18 October 2011, and Muslija/Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 32042/11, 14 January 2014). 
However, neither of these cases provided a sound 
basis for such a departure.
The first case, Zigarella, had concerned 
subsequent, not parallel, proceedings, contrary to 
what the chamber had assumed. The subsequent 
criminal proceedings, brought without the 
authorities' knowledge of an existing finalised set 
of (also criminal) proceedings, had been 
discontinued when the judge learned of the final 
acquittal in the first case. In this situation the 
court had merely applied the negative material 
effect of ne bis in idem as a res judicata rule in 
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relation to two succeeding sets of ordinary 
criminal proceedings in respect of the same 
offence.
The two other cases, Tomasovic and Muslija, 
had concerned proceedings for offences under 
‘hard-core’ criminal law, respectively possession 
of hard drugs and domestic violence (they 
referred to Jussila, cited above, §43). The cases 
clearly involved two sets of criminal proceedings 
concerning one act. Both the first and the second 
set had been initiated on the basis of the same 
police report. These situations would at face value 
not occur under Norwegian criminal law and 
bore at any rate little resemblance to the well-
established and traditional systems of 
administrative and criminal proceedings relating 
to tax penalties and tax fraud at stake here.
77. Requiring the discontinuance of another 
pending parallel set of proceedings from the date 
on which other proceedings on the same matter 
had given rise to a final decision amounted to a de 
facto lis pendens procedural hindrance, as there 
was little sense in initiating parallel proceedings 
if one set had to be discontinued just because the 
other set had become final before it.
78. In the Government's submission, against 
this backdrop of renewed inconsistency in the 
case-law under Article 4 of Protocol 7, it was of 
particular importance for the Grand chamber to 
reassert its approach in Zolotukhin, affirming the 
provision as a res judicata rule, and to reject the 
differing approach in Nykänen.
79. The Government failed to see the policy 
considerations behind Nykänen. The underlying 
idea behind the ne bis in idem rule was to be 
protected against the burden of being exposed to 
repeated proceedings (they referred to Zolotukhin, 
cited above, §107). An individual should have the 
certainty that when an acquittal or conviction had 
acquired the force of res judicata, he or she would 
henceforth be shielded from the institution of 
new proceedings for the same act. This 
consideration did not apply in a situation where 
an individual was subjected to foreseeable 
criminal and administrative proceedings in 
parallel, as prescribed by law, and certainly not 
where the first sanction (tax penalties) was, in a 
foreseeable manner, taken into account in the 
decision on the second sanction (imprisonment).
80. It was further difficult to reconcile the 
view that, while pending, parallel proceedings 
were clearly unproblematic under the Protocol, 
with the view that, as soon as one set had reached 
a final conclusion, the other set would constitute 
a violation, regardless of whether the more 
lenient administrative proceedings or the more 
severe criminal proceedings had been concluded 
first and regardless of whether the latter had 
commenced first or last.
81. Nykänen also ran counter to the 
fundamental principles of foreseeability and equal 
treatment. In the event that the criminal 
proceedings acquired the force of res judicata before 
the administrative proceedings, one individual 
could end up serving time in prison, while another 
individual, for the same offence, would simply have 
to pay a moderate administrative penalty. The 
question of which proceedings terminated first 
depended on how the taxation authorities, police, 
prosecuting authorities or courts progressed, and 
whether the taxpayer availed himself or herself of 
an administrative complaint and/or legal 
proceedings. Nykänen would thus oblige States to 
treat persons in equal situations unequally 
according to mere coincidences. As acknowledged 
in Nykänen, ‘it might sometimes be coincidental 
which of the parallel proceedings first becomes 
final, thereby possibly creating a concern about 
unequal treatment’.
82. The need for efficiency in the handling of 
cases would often militate in favour of parallel 
proceedings. On the one hand, it ought to be 
noted that, owing to their specialised knowledge 
and capacity, administrative authorities would 
frequently be able to impose an administrative 
sanction more swiftly than would the prosecution 
and courts within the framework of criminal 
proceedings. Owing to their role of large-scale 
administration, the administrative authorities 
would moreover be better placed to ensure that 
same offences be treated equally. crime 
prevention, on the other hand, demanded that the 
State should not be precluded from prosecuting 
and punishing crimes within traditional, formal 
penal procedures where the administrative and 
criminal proceedings disclosed offences of greater 
severity and complexity than those which may 
have led to the administrative process and 
sanctioning in the first place. According to the 
Government, the applicants’ cases were 
illustrative examples of such situations.
83. The Government noted that several 
European States maintained a dual system of 
sanctions in areas such as tax law and public 
safety (they referred to the reasons given in the 
opinion of 12 June 2012 of the Advocate General 
before the court of Justice of the European union 
in the Fransson case, quoted at paragraph 51 
above).
84. In Norway, the issue of continued parallel 
proceedings was not restricted to taxation. If 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 were to be interpreted 
so as to prohibit the finalisation of ongoing 
parallel proceedings from the moment either 
administrative or criminal proceedings were 
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concluded by a final decision, it would entail far-
reaching, adverse and unforeseeable effects in a 
number of administrative-law areas. This called 
for a cautious approach. Similar questions would 
arise in a number of European States with well-
established parallel administrative and criminal 
systems in fundamental areas of law, including 
taxation.
85. The considerations underlying Article 4 
of Protocol No. 7 applied to a lesser degree where 
the proceedings in question were parallel and 
simultaneous. A defendant who was well aware 
that he or she was subjected by different 
authorities to two different sets of proceedings 
closely connected in substance and in time, would 
be less inclined to expect that the first sanction 
imposed would be final and exclusive with regard 
to the other. Finally, the rationale of the ne bis in 
idem principle applied to a lesser degree to 
sanctions falling outside the ‘hard core’ of criminal 
law, such as tax penalties (they referred to the 
reasoning in Jussila, cited above, § 43, with regard 
to Article 6, which was transposable to Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7).
86. As regards the specific circumstances, 
the Government fully endorsed the reasoning of 
the Supreme court in the case of the first 
applicant (see paragraph 29 above) and that of 
the High court in the case of the second applicant 
(see paragraph 39 above) that there was a 
sufficiently close connection in substance and 
time. Neither of the applicants could have 
legitimately expected to be subjected only to the 
administrative proceedings and sanction. In order 
to avoid an outcome that would run counter to 
the fundamental requirement of equal treatment, 
so the Government explained, the applicants had, 
‘on an equal footing with’ E.K. and B.L. who were 
defendants in the same case-complex (see 
paragraphs 12–13 above), each been sentenced to 
imprisonment in criminal proceedings after 
having had a 30% administrative tax surcharge 
imposed.
3. Third-party interveners
87. The third-party interventions were 
primarily centred on two points; firstly the 
interpretation of the adjective ‘criminal’ in Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7 and the relationship between 
this provision and both Article 6 (criminal head) 
and Article 7 of the convention; and secondly the 
extent to which parallel proceedings were 
permissible under the Protocol (dealt with under 
sub-headings (a) and (b) below).
(a) Whether the first set of proceedings 
concerned a ‘criminal’ matter
88. The Governments of the czech Republic 
and France joined the respondent Government in 
observing that the Zolotukhin judgment did not 
explicitly abandon the broader range of criteria 
for the determination of the character of the 
proceedings to be assessed under Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 and that the court had itself 
considered, inter alia, proceedings on tax penalties 
to fall outside the hard core of criminal law and 
thus applied less stringent guarantees under 
Article 6 (they referred to Jussila, cited above, § 43 
in fine). The czech Government invited the court 
to clarify primarily whether and, if so, under what 
conditions, that is in which types of cases, the 
broader criteria ought to be applied.
89. The Bulgarian Government, referring to 
the wording of the provision and its purpose, 
maintained that only traditional criminal offences 
fell within the ambit of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 
Whilst extending the scope of Article 6 was 
paramount for the protection of the right to a fair 
trial, the purpose of the provision in the Protocol 
was different. Referring to the ruling of the Supreme 
court of the united States of America in Green/
United States, 355 uS 194 (1957), they stressed that 
the double-jeopardy clause protected an individual 
from being subjected to the hazards of trial and 
possible conviction more than once for an alleged 
offence. The underlying idea was that the State with 
all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for 
an alleged offence, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and 
compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that, even though innocent, he may be 
found guilty. A second vitally important interest 
was to preserve the finality of judgments.
90. The French Government made extensive 
submissions (paragraphs 10 to 26 of their 
observations) on the interpretation of Articles 6 
and 7 of the convention and of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7. Referring to Perinçek/Switzerland 
([Gc], 27510/08, §146, 15 October 2015), they 
argued that the terms used in Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7, which differed from those in Article 6 § 1 of 
the convention, must result in the adoption of 
narrower criteria serving the principle of ne bis in 
idem protected by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 
Article 7 of the convention referred to the notions 
of conviction (‘held guilty’ in English; ‘condamné’ 
in French), ‘criminal offence’ (‘infraction’ in 
French) and ‘penalty’ (‘peine’ in French), which 
were also to be found in Article 4 of Protocol No. 
7. Furthermore, the protection afforded by Article 
7 of the convention, like that afforded by Article 4 
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of Protocol No. 7, concerned essential components 
of criminal procedure, understood in a strict 
sense. This was borne out by the fact that no 
derogation from the obligations concerned was 
allowed under Article 15, whereas that Article did 
provide for derogation from Article 6.
91. It followed that, for reasons of 
consistency, the court should, in applying Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7, rely only on the criteria it had 
formulated in the framework of Article 7 of the 
convention, while clarifying them in order to 
assign to the words ‘in criminal proceedings’, as 
used in Article 4, the strict meaning that was 
called for. In seeking to determine whether a 
measure fell within the scope of the latter, the 
court ought to consider: the legal classification of 
the offence in domestic law; the purpose and 
nature of the measure concerned; whether the 
measure was imposed following conviction for a 
criminal offence; the severity of the penalty, it 
being understood that this was not a decisive 
element; and the procedures associated with the 
adoption of the measure (and in particular 
whether the measure was adopted by a body 
which could be characterised as a court and 
which adjudicated on the elements of an offence 
regarded as criminal within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the convention). The last of these 
criteria was of paramount importance having 
regard to the actual wording and purpose of 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
92. In the light of these criteria, one could 
not regard as falling within the scope of Article 4 
of Protocol No. 7 tax penalties which were not 
classified as criminal in domestic law, which 
were administrative in nature and intended only 
as a sanction for a taxpayer's failure to comply 
with fiscal obligations, which were not imposed 
following conviction for a criminal offence and 
which were not imposed by a judicial body.
93. The Swiss Government submitted that 
the only exception allowed — under Article 4 § 2 
of Protocol No. 7 — was the reopening of the case 
‘in accordance with the law and penal procedure 
of the State concerned’. At the time of adoption of 
the Protocol in 1984, other exceptions, such as 
those subsequently allowed by the relevant case-
law, were not provided for — and did not require 
such provision in view of the inherently criminal 
focus of the protection concerned. The narrow 
conception underlying the guarantee was 
tellingly confirmed at Article 4 § 3, which ruled 
out any derogation under Article 15 of the 
convention in respect of the protection provided 
by Article 4 § 1. The ne bis in idem guarantee was 
thus placed on an equal footing with the right to 
life (Article 2; Article 3, Protocol No. 6; Article 2, 
Protocol No. 13), the prohibition of torture (Article 
3), the prohibition of slavery (Article 4) and the 
principle of no punishment without law (Article 
7). These elements militated in favour of a 
restrictive interpretation of the protection. The 
case for such an approach would be still more 
persuasive if the Grand chamber were to 
maintain the practice that any ‘criminal charge’ in 
the autonomous sense of Article 6 § 1 was 
likewise such as to attract the application of 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (see paragraph 100 
below).
(b) Duplication of proceedings (bis)
94. The Bulgarian Government found no 
reason to depart from the approach in R.T./
Switzerland and Nilsson/Sweden (both cited 
above) in the context of road traffic offences and 
in important areas relating to the functioning of 
the State such as taxation. Parallel tax proceedings 
ending in tax penalties and criminal proceedings 
for investigating tax fraud were closely related in 
substance and in time. Also, the court had 
recognised that the contracting States enjoyed a 
wide margin of appreciation when framing and 
implementing policies in the area of taxation and 
that the court would respect the legislature's 
assessment of such matters unless it was devoid 
of any reasonable foundation. A system allowing 
for parallel proceedings in taxation matters 
seemed to fall within the State's margin of 
appreciation and did not appear per se to run 
counter to any of the principles protected in the 
convention, including the guarantee against 
double jeopardy.
95. The czech Government advanced four 
arguments for preserving the existence of dual 
systems of sanctioning:
(1) each type of sanction pursued different 
goals;
(2) whilst criminal proceedings stricto sensu 
had to comply with stringent fair trial guarantees, 
the fulfilment of which was often time-
consuming, administrative sanctions needed to 
comply with demands of speediness, effectiveness 
and sustainability of the tax system and State 
budget;
(3) the strict application of the ne bis in idem 
principle to parallel tax and criminal proceedings 
might defeat the handling of large-scale organised 
crime if the first decision, usually an administrative 
one, were to impede a criminal investigation 
leading to the revelation of networks of organised 
fraud, money laundering, embezzlement and 
other serious crime;
(4) the sequence of the authorities deciding 
in a particular case. Finally, the czech Government 
drew attention to cases of several concurrent 
administrative proceedings.
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96. The French Government were of the view 
that the reasoning adopted in R.T./Switzerland and 
Nilsson/Sweden might be transposed to the field of 
taxation having regard to the aims pursued by the 
States in that field, the aims of criminal 
proceedings and those pursued by the imposition 
of tax penalties being different (i) and where 
there was a sufficient connection between the 
fiscal and the criminal proceedings (ii):
(i) criminal prosecution for tax evasion must 
constitute an appropriate and consistent 
response to reprehensible conduct. Its primary 
purpose was to punish the most serious forms of 
misconduct. In its decision in Rosenquist/Sweden 
((dec.), 60619/00, 14 September 2004), the court 
had observed that the purpose of prosecuting the 
criminal offence of tax evasion differed from that 
of the imposition of a fiscal penalty, the latter 
seeking to secure the foundations of the national 
tax system.
criminal proceedings for tax evasion also served 
an exemplary function, especially where new 
types of fraud came to light, with a view to 
dissuading potential tax evaders from going 
down that particular road. Not to bring the most 
serious cases of tax evasion to trial where a tax 
penalty had already been imposed would be to 
deprive the State of the exemplary force of, and 
publicity provided by, criminal convictions in 
such cases.
In the event that a judicial investigation in a 
matter of tax evasion was set in motion prior to 
an audit by the tax authority, an obligation to 
discontinue the second action once the outcome 
of the first had become final would encourage the 
taxpayer to let the criminal proceedings reach a 
swift conclusion, without denying the charge, in 
such a way that those proceedings would be 
terminated in advance of the tax audit and the 
administrative sanctions, which generally 
represented much larger sums, would thus be 
avoided.
In such a situation, a taxpayer under investigation 
would be in a position to opt for whichever 
procedure offered the most favourable outcome; 
this would most certainly detract from the 
dissuasive force of action by the State to punish 
the most reprehensible conduct in this area. It 
would be paradoxical indeed for taxpayers who 
had committed the most serious forms of tax 
fraud and who were prosecuted for such offence, 
to receive less severe penalties.
In conclusion, complementary criminal and 
administrative action was essential in dealing 
with the most serious tax fraud cases and it 
would be artificial to consider that, simply 
because two sets of proceedings and two 
authorities came into play, the two forms of 
sanction did not form a coherent whole in 
response to this type of offence. The two types of 
proceedings were in reality closely connected 
and it ought therefore be possible for them both 
to be pursued.
(ii) In the cases against Finland of 20 May 2014, 
the main criterion identified by the court for 
refusing to allow a second set of proceedings was 
the total independence of the fiscal procedure on 
the one hand and the criminal proceedings on 
the other. However, the fiscal and criminal 
proceedings ought to be regarded as connected 
in substance and in time where there was an 
exchange of information between the two 
authorities and where the two sets of proceedings 
were conducted simultaneously. The facts of the 
case would demonstrate the complementary 
nature of the proceedings.
By way of illustration, the Government provided 
a detailed survey of the manner in which, under 
the French system, criminal and fiscal 
proceedings were interwoven, how they 
overlapped in law and in practice, and were 
conducted simultaneously. The principle of 
proportionality implied that the overall amount 
of any penalties imposed should not exceed the 
highest amount that could be imposed in respect 
of either of the types of penalty.
In determining whether criminal and fiscal 
proceedings might be regarded as sufficiently 
closely connected in time, account ought to be 
taken only of the phase of assessment by the tax 
authority and that of the judicial investigation. 
These two phases ought to proceed 
simultaneously or be separated by only a very 
short time interval. It did not, on the other hand, 
appear relevant, in assessing the closeness of the 
connection in time between the two sets of 
proceedings, to consider the duration of the 
judicial proceedings before the courts called 
upon to deliver judgment in the criminal case 
and rule on the validity of the tax penalties. It 
ought to be borne in mind that the response time 
of the various courts depended on external 
factors, sometimes attributable to the taxpayer 
concerned. He or she might choose to deliberately 
prolong the proceedings in one of the courts by 
introducing large numbers of requests, or by 
submitting numerous written documents which 
would then call for an exchange of arguments, or 
again by lodging appeals.
The States should be afforded a margin of 
appreciation in defining appropriate penalties for 
types of conduct which might give rise to distinct 
forms of harm. While providing for a single 
response, the State should be able to assign to a 
number of — judicial and administrative — 
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authorities the task of furnishing an appropriate 
response.
97. The Greek Government maintained that 
the existence of separate and consecutive 
proceedings, in the course of which the same or 
different measures of a criminal nature were 
imposed on an applicant, was the decisive and 
crucial factor for the notion of ‘repetition’ (‘bis’). 
The ne bis in idem principle was not breached in 
the event that different measures of a ‘criminal’ 
nature, though distinct from one another, were 
imposed by different authorities, criminal and 
administrative respectively, which considered all 
the sanctions in their entirety when meting out 
the punishment (they referred to R.T./Switzerland, 
cited above).
98. On the other hand, the Greek Government 
pointed to Kapetanios and Others/Greece (3453/12, 
42941/12 and 9028/13, §72, 30 April 2015), in 
which the court had held that the ne bis in idem 
principle would in principle not be violated where 
both sanctions, namely the deprivation of liberty 
and a pecuniary penalty, were imposed in the 
context of a single judicial procedure. Regardless 
of this example, it was apparent that the court 
attached great importance to the fact that the 
imposition of criminal and administrative 
penalties had been the subject of an overall 
judicial assessment.
99. Nonetheless, they did not disagree with 
the view held by the Norwegian Supreme court 
in the present case that parallel proceedings were 
at least to some extent permissible under Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7. This was strongly supported 
by the cJEu judgment in the Fransson case (they 
referred to § 34 of the judgment, quoted at 
paragraph 52 above).
The cJEu had specified that it was for the 
referring court to determine, in the light of the set 
criteria, whether the combining of tax penalties 
and criminal penalties that was provided for by 
national law should be examined in relation to 
national standards, namely as being analogous to 
those applicable to infringements of national law 
of a similar nature and importance, where the 
choice of penalties remained within the 
discretion of the member State; thus it was for 
the national courts to determine whether the 
combination of penalties was contrary to those 
standards, as long as the remaining penalties 
were effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
(they referred to § 37 of the judgment, quoted at 
paragraph 52 above).
The aforementioned ruling of the cJEu appeared 
relevant to the present case. More specifically, 
within the framework of such interpretation, it 
could be inferred mutatis mutandis that the national 
judges had indeed duly ruled, at their sole discretion, 
as found by the cJEu, that the combination of the 
sanctions at issue, imposed through so-called 
‘parallel proceedings’ upon close interaction 
between two distinct authorities, had not been in 
breach of the national standards, despite the fact 
that national judges had essentially assessed the tax 
sanctions as being of a ‘criminal nature’. In view of 
the arguments in paragraph 97 above, it could 
reasonably be concluded that parallel proceedings, 
imposing different sanctions through different 
authorities, clearly distinct in law, were not 
prohibited by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 whenever 
such proceedings satisfied the test of being closely 
connected in substance and in time. This test 
answered the critical question whether there had 
been repetition.
100.  The Swiss Government, relying on 
Zolotukhin (cited above, § 83), maintained that 
the guarantee set forth in Article 4 of Protocol No. 
7 became relevant on the institution of a new 
prosecution, where a prior acquittal or conviction 
had already acquired the force of res judicata. A 
situation in which criminal proceedings had not 
been completed at the point in time at which an 
administrative procedure was initiated was not 
therefore, in itself, problematic with regard to the 
ne bis in idem principle (they referred, mutatis 
mutandis, to Kapetanios and Others, cited above, 
§ 72). It followed that parallel procedures were 
permissible under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. The 
present case afforded the Grand chamber an 
opportunity to reaffirm this line of authority.
The justification for a dual system resided 
primarily in the nature of, and distinct aims 
pursued by, administrative law (preventive and 
educative) on the one hand, and criminal law 
(retributive), on the other.
Whilst the notion of a ‘criminal charge’ in 
Article 6 had, in the light of the Engel criteria, 
been extended beyond the traditional categories 
of criminal law (malum in se) to cover other areas 
(malum quia prohibitum), there were criminal 
charges of differing weight. In the case, for 
example, of tax penalties — which fell outside the 
hard core of criminal law — the guarantees under 
the criminal head of Article 6 of the convention 
ought not necessarily to apply with their full 
stringency (they referred to Jussila, cited above, 
§ 43). This ought to be taken into account when 
determining the scope of application of Article 4 
of Protocol No. 7.
The foreseeability of the cumulative imposition 
of administrative and criminal sanctions was 
another element to be considered in the assessment 
of the dual system (they referred to Maszni/
Romania, 59892/00, 21 September 2006, § 68).
In the Swiss Government's view, Zolotukhin 
should not be interpreted or developed in such a 
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way as to embrace the full range of systems 
providing for both administrative and criminal 
sanctions for criminal offences, without regard for 
the fact that different authorities, possessing 
different competences and pursuing separate 
aims, might be called upon to deliver decisions on 
the same set of facts. At all events, this conclusion 
was persuasive in instances where there was a 
sufficiently close connection in substance and in 
time between the criminal proceedings on the one 
hand and the administrative procedure on the 
other, as required by the court (they referred to 
the following cases where the court had been 
satisfied that this condition had been fulfilled: 
Boman /Finland, 41604/11, § 41, 17 February 2015, 
with reference to R.T. /Switzerland and Nilsson /
Sweden, both cited above, and also Maszni, cited 
above). The Swiss Government invited the Grand 
chamber to take the opportunity afforded by the 
present case to reaffirm this approach, which was 
not prohibited per se in its case-law as it stood.
4. The Court's assessment
101.  The court will first review its existing 
case-law relevant for the interpretation and 
application of the ne bis in idem rule laid down in 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (sub-titles ‘(a)’ to ‘(c)’ 
below). In the light of that review, it will seek to 
draw such conclusions, derive such principles 
and add such clarifications as are necessary for 
considering the present case (sub-title ‘(d)’ 
below). Finally, it will apply the ne bis in idem rule, 
as so interpreted by it, to the facts complained of 
by the applicants (sub-title ‘(e)’ below).
(a) General issues of interpretation
102.  It is to be noted that in the pleadings of 
the parties and the third-party interveners there 
was hardly any disagreement regarding the most 
significant contribution of the Grand chamber 
judgment in Zolotukhin (cited above), which was 
to clarify the criteria relating to the assessment of 
whether the offence for which an applicant had 
been tried or punished in the second set of 
proceedings was the same (idem) as that for 
which a decision had been rendered in the first 
set (see §§ 70 to 84 of the judgment). Nor was 
there any substantial disagreement regarding the 
criteria laid down in that judgment for 
determining when a ‘final’ decision had been 
taken.
103.  In contrast, differing views were 
expressed as to the method to be used for 
determining whether the proceedings relating to 
the imposition of tax penalties were ‘criminal’ for 
the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 — his 
being an issue capable of having implications for 
the applicability of this provision's prohibition of 
double jeopardy.
104.  In addition, there were conflicting 
approaches (notably between the applicants, on 
the one hand, and the respondent Government 
and the intervening Governments, on the other) 
as regards duplication of proceedings, in 
particular the extent to which parallel or dual 
proceedings ought to be permissible under 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
(b) Relevant criteria for determining whether the 
first set of proceedings was ‘criminal’: Different 
approaches in the case-law
In Zolotukhin (cited above), in order to determine 
whether the proceedings in question could be 
regarded as ‘criminal’ in the context of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7, the court applied the three Engel 
criteria previously developed for the purposes of 
Article 6 of the convention:
(1) ‘the legal classification of the offence under 
national law’,
(2) ‘the very nature of the offence’ and
(3) the degree of severity of the penalty that the 
person concerned risks incurring — the second 
and third criteria being alternative, not 
necessarily cumulative, whilst a cumulative 
approach was not excluded.
The Zolotukhin judgment did not, as it could have 
done, mirror the line of reasoning followed in a 
string of previous cases (see, for example, 
Storbråten, cited above), involving a non-
exhaustive (‘such as’) and wider range of factors, 
with no indication of their weight or whether 
they were alternative or cumulative. The 
Governments of France and Norway are now 
inviting the court to use the opportunity of the 
present judgment to affirm that it is the latter, 
broader test which should apply (see paragraphs 
66–68 and 90–91).
106.  A number of arguments going in the 
direction of such an interpretive approach do 
exist, in particular that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 
was apparently intended by its drafters for 
criminal proceedings in the strict sense and that 
— unlike Article 6, but like Article 7 — it is a non-
derogable right under Article 15. Whilst Article 6 
is limited to embodying fair-hearing guarantees 
for criminal proceedings, the prohibition of 
double jeopardy in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 has 
certain implications — potentially wide ones — 
for the manner of applying domestic law on 
criminal and administrative penalties across a 
vast range of activities. The latter Article involves 
a more detailed assessment of the substantive 
criminal law, in that there is a need to establish 
whether the respective offences concerned the 
same conduct (idem). These differences, the lack 
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of consensus among the domestic systems of the 
contracting States and the variable willingness of 
States to be bound by the Protocol and the wide 
margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the 
States in deciding on their penal systems and 
policies generally (see Nykänen, cited above, § 48; 
and, mutatis mutandis, Achour/France [Gc], 
67335/01, § 44, EcHR 2006-IV) are well capable 
of justifying a broader range of applicability 
criteria, in particular with a stronger national-law 
component, as used for Article 7 and previously 
used (before Zolotukhin), for Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7, and hence a narrower scope of application, 
than is the case under Article 6.
107.  However, whilst it is true, as has been 
pointed out, that the Zolotukhin judgment was 
not explicit on the matter, the court must be 
taken to have made a deliberate choice in that 
judgment to opt for the Engel criteria as the 
model test for determining whether the 
proceedings concerned were ‘criminal’ for the 
purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. It does not 
seem justified for the court to depart from that 
analysis in the present case, as there are indeed 
weighty considerations that militate in favour of 
such a choice. The ne bis in idem principle is 
mainly concerned with due process, which is the 
object of Article 6, and is less concerned with the 
substance of the criminal law than Article 7. The 
court finds it more appropriate, for the 
consistency of interpretation of the convention 
taken as a whole, for the applicability of the 
principle to be governed by the same, more 
precise criteria as in Engel. That said, as already 
acknowledged above, once the ne bis in idem 
principle has been found to be applicable, there is 
an evident need for a calibrated approach in 
regard to the manner in which the principle is 
applied to proceedings combining administrative 
and criminal penalties.
(c) Convention case-law on dual proceedings
(i) What the Zolotukhin judgment added
108.  Zolotukhin concerned two sets of 
proceedings, both relating to disorderly conduct 
vis-à-vis a public official and in which the 
outcome of the administrative proceedings had 
become final even before the criminal 
proceedings were instituted (see Zolotukhin, cited 
above, §§ 18–20 and 109). The most significant 
contribution of the Zolotukhin judgment was the 
holding that the determination as to whether the 
offences in question were the same (idem) was to 
depend on a facts-based assessment (ibid., § 84), 
rather than, for example, on the formal 
assessment consisting of comparing the ‘essential 
elements’ of the offences. The prohibition 
concerns prosecution or trial for a second 
‘offence’ in so far as the latter arises from identical 
facts or facts which are substantially the same 
(ibid., § 82).
109.  Furthermore, when recalling that the 
aim of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 was to prohibit 
the repetition of criminal proceedings that had 
been concluded by a ‘final’ decision (‘res judicata’), 
the Zolotukhin judgment specified that decisions 
against which an ordinary appeal lay were 
excluded from the scope of the guarantee in 
Protocol No. 7 as long as the time-limit for lodging 
such an appeal had not expired.
110.  The court also strongly affirmed that 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 was not confined to the 
right not to be punished twice but that it 
extended to the right not to be prosecuted or 
tried twice. Were this not the case, it would not 
have been necessary to use the word ‘tried’ as 
well as the word ‘punished’ since this would be 
mere duplication. The court thus reiterated that 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 applied even where the 
individual had merely been prosecuted in 
proceedings that had not resulted in a conviction. 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 contained three distinct 
guarantees and provided that, for the same 
offence, no one should be (i) liable to be tried, (ii) 
tried, or (iii) punished (ibid., § 110).
111.  It should be noted, however, that the 
Zolotukhin judgment offered little guidance for 
situations where the proceedings have not in 
reality been duplicated but have rather been 
combined in an integrated manner so as to form 
a coherent whole.
(ii) The case-law on dual proceedings before 
and after Zolotukhin
112.  After the Zolotukhin judgment, as had 
been the position previously, the imposition by 
different authorities of different sanctions 
concerning the same conduct was accepted by 
the court as being to some extent permissible 
under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, notwithstanding 
the existence of a final decision. This conclusion 
can be understood as having been based on the 
premise that the combination of sanctions in 
those cases ought to be considered as a whole, 
making it artificial to view the matter as one of 
duplication of proceedings leading the applicant 
to being ‘tried or punished again … for an offence 
for which he has already been finally … convicted’ 
in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. The issue 
has arisen in four types of situations.
113.  At the origin of this interpretative 
analysis of Article 4, is a first category of cases, 
going back to R.T. /Switzerland, cited above. R.T. 
concerned an applicant whose driving licence 
had been withdrawn (for four months) in May 
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1993 by the Road Traffic Office on account of 
drunken driving. This measure was eventually 
confirmed by judgments of the Administrative 
Appeals commission and the Federal court 
(December 1995). In the meantime, in June 1993 
the Gossau District Office had imposed a penal 
order on the applicant which sentenced him to a 
suspended term of imprisonment and a fine of 
1,100 Swiss francs (cHF). This penal order was not 
appealed against and acquired legal force.
The court found that the Swiss authorities 
had merely been determining the three different, 
cumulable sanctions envisaged by law for such 
an offence, namely a prison sentence, a fine and 
the withdrawal of the driving licence. These 
sanctions had been issued at the same time by 
two different authorities, namely by a criminal 
and by an administrative authority. It could not, 
therefore, be said that criminal proceedings were 
being repeated contrary to Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7 within the meaning of the court's case-law.
Similarly, while Nilsson/Sweden, cited above, 
also concerned criminal punishment (50 hours' 
community service) and withdrawal of a driving 
licence (for 18 months) on the ground of a road-
traffic offence, the complaint was disposed of on 
more elaborate reasoning, introducing for the first 
time the test of ‘a sufficiently close connection …, 
in substance and in time’.
The court found that the licence withdrawal 
had been a direct and foreseeable consequence of 
the applicant's earlier conviction for the same 
offences of aggravated drunken driving and 
unlawful driving and that the withdrawal on the 
ground of a criminal conviction constituted a 
‘criminal’ matter for the purposes of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7. Furthermore, the severity of the 
measure — suspension of the applicant's driving 
licence for 18 months — was in itself so significant, 
regardless of the context of his previous criminal 
conviction, that it could ordinarily be viewed as a 
criminal sanction. While the different sanctions 
were imposed by two different authorities in 
different proceedings, there was nevertheless a 
sufficiently close connection between them, in 
substance and in time, to consider the withdrawal 
to be part of the sanctions under Swedish law for 
the offences of aggravated drunken driving and 
unlawful driving. The licence withdrawal did not 
imply that the applicant had been ‘tried or 
punished again … for an offence for which he had 
already been finally … convicted’, in breach of 
Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7.
Likewise, in Boman, cited above, the court was 
satisfied that a sufficient substantive and 
temporal connection existed between, on the one 
hand, the criminal proceedings in which the 
applicant had been convicted and sentenced (to 
75 day-fines, amounting to EuR 450) and banned 
from driving (for 4 months and 3 weeks) and, on 
the other, the subsequent administrative 
proceedings, leading to the prolongation of the 
driving ban (for 1 month).
114.  In a second series of cases, the court 
reaffirmed that parallel proceedings were not 
excluded in relation to the imposition of tax 
penalties in administrative proceedings and 
prosecution, conviction and sentencing for tax 
fraud in criminal proceedings, but concluded that 
the test of ‘a sufficiently close connection …, in 
substance and in time’ had not been satisfied in 
the particular circumstances under consideration. 
These cases concerned Finland (notably Glantz, 
cited above, § 57 and Nykänen, cited above, § 47) 
and Sweden (Lucky Dev/Sweden, 7356/10, § 58, 27 
November 2014). In Nykänen, which set out the 
approach followed in the other cases against 
Finland and Sweden, the court found on the facts 
that, under the Finnish system, the criminal and 
the administrative sanctions had been imposed 
by different authorities without the proceedings 
being in any way connected: both sets of 
proceedings followed their own separate course 
and became final independently of each other. 
Moreover, neither of the sanctions had been 
taken into consideration by the other court or 
authority in determining the severity of the 
sanction, nor was there any other interaction 
between the relevant authorities. More 
importantly, under the Finnish system the tax 
penalties had been imposed following an 
examination of an applicant's conduct and his or 
her liability under the relevant tax legislation, 
which was independent from the assessments 
made in the criminal proceedings. In conclusion, 
the court held that there had been a violation of 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the convention since 
the applicant had been convicted twice for the 
same matter in two separate sets of proceedings.
Identical (or almost identical) reasoning and 
conclusions may be found in respect of similar 
facts in Rinas/Finland, 17039/13, 27 January 2015, 
and Österlund /Finland, 53197/13, 10 February 
2015.
It is to be noted that, while in some of these 
judgments (Nykänen, Glantz, Lucky Dev, Rinas, 
Österlund) the two sets of proceedings were largely 
contemporaneous, the temporal connection on its 
own was evidently deemed insufficient to exclude 
the application of the ne bis in idem prohibition. It 
would not seem unreasonable to deduce from 
these judgments in cases against Finland and 
Sweden that, given that the two sets of proceedings 
were largely contemporaneous, in the particular 
circumstances it was the lack of a substantive 
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connection that gave rise to the violation of Article 
4 of Protocol No. 7.
115.  In a third strand of case-law, where 
proceedings had been conducted in parallel for a 
certain period of time, the court found a violation 
but without referring to the Nilsson test of ‘a 
sufficiently close connection … in substance and 
in time’.
In Tomasović (cited above, §§ 5–10 and 30–
32), the applicant had been prosecuted and 
convicted twice for the same offence of 
possession of drugs, first as a ‘minor offence’ 
(held to be ‘criminal’ according to the second and 
third Engel criteria (ibid. §§ 22–25)) and then as a 
‘criminal offence’. As the second set of 
proceedings had not been discontinued on the 
conclusion of the first, the court found it evident 
that there had been duplication of criminal 
proceedings in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 
7 (see, similarly, Muslija, cited above, §§ 28–32 
and 37, in relation to the infliction of grievous 
bodily harm).
Similarly, in Grande Stevens and Others /Italy 
(nos. 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10 
and 18698/10, 4 March 2014), the court found 
that there had been dual proceedings in respect 
of the same fraudulent conduct — namely market 
manipulation through the dissemination of false 
information: one set of administrative 
proceedings (from 9 February 2007 to 23 June 
2009), which were considered ‘criminal’ 
according to the Engel criteria, were conducted 
before the National companies and Stock 
Exchange commission (Commissione Nazionale 
per le Societa e la Borsa — ‘cONSOB’), followed by 
appeals to the court of Appeal and the court of 
cassation and culminating in the imposition of a 
fine of € 3,000,000 (plus a business ban); the 
other set being criminal proceedings (from 7 
November 2008 to 28 February 2013 and beyond, 
still pending at the time of judgment) conducted 
before the District court, the court of cassation 
and the court of Appeal. Its finding that the new 
set of proceedings concerned a second ‘offence’ 
originating in identical acts to those which had 
been the subject-matter of the first, and final, 
conviction was sufficient for the court to 
conclude that there had been a breach of Article 4 
of Protocol No. 7.
116.  Fourthly, a further and distinct illustration 
of a lack of substantive connection without specific 
reference to the above-mentioned Nilsson test is 
provided by Kapetanios and Others (cited above), 
which was confirmed by Sismanidis and Sitaridis/
Greece, 66602/09 and 71879/12, 9 June 2016. In 
these cases the applicants had in the first place 
been acquitted of customs offences in criminal 
proceedings. Subsequently, notwithstanding their 
acquittals, the administrative courts imposed on 
the applicants heavy administrative fines on 
account of the self-same conduct. Being satisfied 
that the latter proceedings were ‘criminal’ for the 
purposes of the prohibition in Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 7, the court concluded that there had been a 
violation of this provision (ibid, respectively, § 73 
and 47).
(d) Conclusions and inferences to be drawn 
from the existing case-law
117.  Whilst a particular duty of care to protect 
the specific interests of the individual sought to be 
safeguarded by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 is 
incumbent on the contracting States, there is also, 
as already indicated in paragraphs 106 above, a 
need to leave the national authorities a choice as to 
the means used to that end. It should not be 
overlooked in this context that the right not to be 
tried or punished twice was not included in the 
convention adopted in 1950 but was added in a 
seventh protocol (adopted in 1984), which entered 
into force in 1988, almost 40 years later. Four States 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and the united 
Kingdom) have not ratified the Protocol; and one of 
these (Germany) plus four States which did ratify 
(Austria, France, Italy and Portugal) have expressed 
reservations or interpretative declarations to the 
effect that ‘criminal’ ought to be applied to these 
States in the way it was understood under their 
respective national laws. (It should be noted that 
the reservations made by Austria and Italy have 
been held to be invalid as they failed to provide a 
brief statement of the law concerned, as required 
by Article 57 § 2 of the convention (see respectively 
Gradinger /Austria, 23 October 1995, § 51, Series A 
328-c; and Grande Stevens, cited above, §§ 204–
211), unlike the reservation made by France (see 
Göktan/France, 33402/96, § 51, EcHR 2002-V).
118.  The court has further taken note of the 
observation made by the Advocate General 
before the court of Justice of the European union 
in the Fransson case (see paragraph 51 above), 
namely that the imposition of penalties under 
both administrative law and criminal law in 
respect of the same offence is a widespread 
practice in the Eu Member States, especially in 
fields such as taxation, environmental policies 
and public safety. The Advocate General also 
pointed out that the way in which penalties were 
accumulated varied enormously between legal 
systems and displayed special features which 
were specific to each member State; in most 
cases those special features were adopted with 
the aim of moderating the effects of the 
imposition of two punishments by the public 
authorities.
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119.  Moreover, no less than six contracting 
Parties to Protocol No. 7 have intervened in the 
present proceedings, mostly expressing views 
and concerns on questions of interpretation that 
are largely common to those stated by the 
respondent Government.
120.  Against this backdrop, the preliminary 
point to be made is that, as recognised in the 
court's well-established case-law, it is in the first 
place for the contracting States to choose how to 
organise their legal system, including their 
criminal-justice procedures (see, for instance, 
Taxquet /Belgium [Gc], 926/05, § 83, EcHR 2010). 
The convention does not, for example, prohibit 
the separation of the sentencing process in a given 
case into different stages or parts, such that 
different penalties may be imposed, successively 
or in parallel, for an offence that is to be 
characterised as ‘criminal’ within the autonomous 
meaning of that notion under the convention 
(see, for instance, Phillips /the United Kingdom, 
41087/98, § 34, EcHR 2001-VII, concerning Article 
6 complaints in regard to confiscation 
proceedings brought against an individual in 
respect of proceeds from drugs offences after 
conviction and sentence of the individual for 
these offences).
121.  In the view of the court, States should be 
able legitimately to choose complementary legal 
responses to socially offensive conduct (such as 
non-compliance with road-traffic regulations or 
non-payment/evasion of taxes) through different 
procedures forming a coherent whole so as to 
address different aspects of the social problem 
involved, provided that the accumulated legal 
responses do not represent an excessive burden 
for the individual concerned.
122.  In cases raising an issue under Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7, it is the task of the court to 
determine whether the specific national measure 
complained of entails, in substance or in effect, 
double jeopardy to the detriment of the individual 
or whether, in contrast, it is the product of an 
integrated system enabling different aspects of 
the wrongdoing to be addressed in a foreseeable 
and proportionate manner forming a coherent 
whole, so that the individual concerned is not 
thereby subjected to injustice.
123.  It cannot be the effect of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 that the contracting States are 
prohibited from organising their legal systems so 
as to provide for the imposition of a standard 
administrative penalty on wrongfully unpaid tax 
(albeit a penalty qualifying as ‘criminal’ for the 
purposes of the convention's fair-trial 
guarantees) also in those more serious cases 
where it may be appropriate to prosecute the 
offender for an additional element present in the 
non-payment, such as fraudulent conduct, which 
is not addressed in the ‘administrative’ tax-
recovery procedure. The object of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 is to prevent the injustice of a 
person's being prosecuted or punished twice for 
the same criminalised conduct. It does not, 
however, outlaw legal systems which take an 
‘integrated’ approach to the social wrongdoing in 
question, and in particular an approach involving 
parallel stages of legal response to the 
wrongdoing by different authorities and for 
different purposes.
124.  The court is of the view that the above-
mentioned case-law on parallel or dual 
proceedings, originating with the R.T./Switzerland 
and Nilsson/Sweden cases and continuing with 
Nykänen and a string of further cases, provides 
useful guidance for situating the fair balance to be 
struck between duly safeguarding the interests of 
the individual protected by the ne bis in idem 
principle, on the one hand, and accommodating 
the particular interest of the community in being 
able to take a calibrated regulatory approach in 
the area concerned, on the other. At the same 
time, before proceeding to further elaborate the 
relevant criteria for the striking of the requisite 
balance, the court deems it desirable to clarify 
the conclusions to be drawn from the existing 
case-law.
125.  In the first place, what emerges from the 
application of the ‘sufficiently close connection 
… in substance and in time’ test in recent cases 
against Finland and Sweden is that this test will 
not be satisfied if one or other of the two 
elements — substantive or temporal — is lacking 
(see paragraph 114 above).
126.  Second, in some cases the court has first 
undertaken an examination whether and, if so, 
when there was a ‘final’ decision in one set of 
proceedings (potentially barring the continuation 
of the other set), before going on to apply the 
‘sufficiently close connection’ test and to reach a 
negative finding on the question of ‘bis’ — that is, 
a finding of the absence of ‘bis’ (see Boman, cited 
above, §§ 36–38). In the court's opinion, however, 
the issue as to whether a decision is ‘final’ or not 
is devoid of relevance when there is no real 
duplication of proceedings but rather a 
combination of proceedings considered to 
constitute an integrated whole.
127.  Third, the foregoing observation should 
also have implications for the concern expressed 
by some of the Governments taking part in the 
present proceedings, namely that it should not be 
a requirement that connected proceedings 
become ‘final’ at the same time. If that were to be 
so, it would enable the interested person to 
exploit the ne bis in idem principle as a tool for 
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manipulation and impunity. On this point, the 
conclusion in paragraph 51 of Nykänen (quoted 
above) and in a number of judgments thereafter 
that ‘both sets of proceedings follow their own 
separate course and become final independently 
from each other’ is to be treated as a finding of 
fact: in the Finnish system under consideration 
there was not a sufficient connection in substance 
between the administrative proceedings and the 
criminal proceedings, although they were 
conducted more or less contemporaneously. 
Nykänen is an illustration of the ‘sufficient 
connection in substance and in time’ test going 
one way on the facts.
128.  Fourth, for similar reasons to those stated 
above, the order in which the proceedings are 
conducted cannot be decisive of whether dual or 
multiple processing is permissible under Article 4 
of Protocol No. 7 (compare and contrast, R.T./
Switzerland — in which the revocation of a licence 
was effected before the criminal proceedings, 
and Nilsson/Sweden — where the revocation took 
place subsequently).
129.  Lastly, it is apparent from some of the 
cases cited above (see Zolothukin, Tomasović, and 
Muslija — described at paragraphs 108 and 115 
above) that, in as much as they concerned the 
duplication of proceedings which had been 
pursued without the purposes and means 
employed being complementary (see paragraph 
130 below), the court was not minded to 
examine them as involving parallel or dual 
proceedings capable of being compatible with 
the ne bis in idem principle, as in R.T./Switzerland, 
Nilsson and Boman (see paragraph 113 above).
130.  On the basis of the foregoing review of 
the court's case-law, it is evident that, in relation 
to matters subject to repression under both 
criminal and administrative law, the surest 
manner of ensuring compliance with Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 is the provision, at some 
appropriate stage, of a single-track procedure 
enabling the parallel strands of legal regulation of 
the activity concerned to be brought together, so 
that the different needs of society in responding 
to the offence can be addressed within the 
framework of a single process. Nonetheless, as 
explained above (see notably paragraphs 111 and 
117–120), Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 does not 
exclude the conduct of dual proceedings, even to 
their term, provided that certain conditions are 
fulfilled. In particular, for the court to be satisfied 
that there is no duplication of trial or punishment 
(bis) as proscribed by Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, 
the respondent State must demonstrate 
convincingly that the dual proceedings in 
question have been ‘sufficiently closely connected 
in substance and in time’. In other words, it must 
be shown that they have been combined in an 
integrated manner so as to form a coherent 
whole. This implies not only that the purposes 
pursued and the means used to achieve them 
should in essence be complementary and linked 
in time, but also that the possible consequences 
of organising the legal treatment of the conduct 
concerned in such a manner should be 
proportionate and foreseeable for the persons 
affected.
131.  As regards the conditions to be satisfied 
in order for dual criminal and administrative 
proceedings to be regarded as sufficiently 
connected in substance and in time and thus 
compatible with the bis criterion in Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7, the relevant considerations 
deriving from the court's case-law, as discussed 
above, may be summarised as follows.
132.  Material factors for determining whether 
there is a sufficiently close connection in 
substance include:
— whether the different proceedings pursue 
complementary purposes and thus address, not 
only in abstracto but also in concreto, different 
aspects of the social misconduct involved;
— whether the duality of proceedings concerned 
is a foreseeable consequence, both in law and in 
practice, of the same impugned conduct (idem);
— whether the relevant sets of proceedings are 
conducted in such a manner as to avoid as far as 
possible any duplication in the collection as well 
as the assessment of the evidence, notably 
through adequate interaction between the 
various competent authorities to bring about that 
the establishment of facts in one set is also used 
in the other set;
— and, above all, whether the sanction imposed 
in the proceedings which become final first is 
taken into account in those which become final 
last, so as to prevent that the individual concerned 
is in the end made to bear an excessive burden, 
this latter risk being least likely to be present 
where there is in place an offsetting mechanism 
designed to ensure that the overall amount of any 
penalties imposed is proportionate.
133.  In this regard, it is also instructive to have 
regard to the manner of application of Article 6 of 
the convention in the type of case that is now 
under consideration (see Jussila, cited above, 
§43):
“[I]t is self-evident that there are criminal 
cases which do not carry any significant 
degree of stigma. There are clearly ‘criminal 
charges’ of differing weight. What is more, the 
autonomous interpretation adopted by the 
convention institutions of the notion of a 
‘criminal charge’ by applying the Engel criteria 
have underpinned a gradual broadening of 
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the criminal head to cases not strictly 
belonging to the traditional categories of the 
criminal law, for example administrative 
penalties …, prison disciplinary proceedings 
…, customs law …, competition law …, and 
penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction 
in financial matters …. Tax surcharges differ 
from the hard core of criminal law; 
consequently, the criminal-head guarantees 
will not necessarily apply with their full 
stringency …”.
The above reasoning reflects considerations of 
relevance when deciding whether Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 has been complied with in cases 
concerning dual administrative and criminal 
proceedings. Moreover, as the court has held on 
many occasions, the convention must be read as a 
whole, and interpreted in such a way as to 
promote internal consistency and harmony 
between its various provisions (see Klass and 
Others/Germany, 6 September 1978, § 68, Series A 
28; also Maaouia/France [Gc], 39652/98, § 36, 
EcHR 2000-X; Kudła/Poland [Gc], 30210/96, § 152, 
EcHR 2000-XI; and Stec and Others/the United 
Kingdom (dec.) [Gc], 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 48, 
EcHR 2005-X).
The extent to which the administrative 
proceedings bear the hallmarks of ordinary 
criminal proceedings is an important factor. 
combined proceedings will more likely meet the 
criteria of complementarity and coherence if the 
sanctions to be imposed in the proceedings not 
formally classified as ‘criminal’ are specific for the 
conduct in question and thus differ from ‘the 
hard core of criminal law’ (in the language of 
Jussila cited above). The additional factor that 
those proceedings do not carry any significant 
degree of stigma renders it less likely that the 
combination of proceedings will entail a 
disproportionate burden on the accused person. 
conversely, the fact that the administrative 
proceedings have stigmatising features largely 
resembling those of ordinary criminal 
proceedings enhances the risk that the social 
purposes pursued in sanctioning the conduct in 
different proceedings will be duplicated (bis) 
rather than complementing one another. The 
outcome of the cases mentioned in paragraph 
129 above may be seen as illustrations of such a 
risk materialising.
134.  Moreover, as already intimated above, 
where the connection in substance is sufficiently 
strong, the requirement of a connection in time 
nonetheless remains and must be satisfied. This 
does not mean, however, that the two sets of 
proceedings have to be conducted simultaneously 
from beginning to end. It should be open to States 
to opt for conducting the proceedings 
progressively in instances where doing so is 
motivated by interests of efficiency and the 
proper administration of justice, pursued for 
different social purposes, and has not caused the 
applicant to suffer disproportionate prejudice. 
However, as indicated above, the connection in 
time must always be present. Thus, the 
connection in time must be sufficiently close to 
protect the individual from being subjected to 
uncertainty and delay and from proceedings 
becoming protracted over time (see, as an 
example of such shortcoming, Kapetanios and 
Others, cited above, § 67), even where the relevant 
national system provides for an ‘integrated’ 
scheme separating administrative and criminal 
components. The weaker the connection in time 
the greater the burden on the State to explain and 
justify any such delay as may be attributable to its 
conduct of the proceedings.
(e) Whether Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 was 
complied with in the present case
(i) The first applicant
135.  In the case of the first applicant, the Tax 
Administration had, on 24 November 2008, 
imposed a 30% tax penalty on him, under sections 
10-2(1) and 10-4(1) of the Tax Assessment Act, on 
the ground that he had omitted to declare in his 
tax return for 2002 the sum of NOK 3,259,342 in 
earnings obtained abroad (see paragraph 16 
above). Since he did not appeal against that 
decision it became final at the earliest on the 
expiry of the three-week time-limit for lodging 
an appeal (see paragraph 143 below). He was also 
subjected to criminal proceedings in connection 
with the same omission in his 2002 tax 
declaration: on 14 October 2008 he was indicted 
and on 2 March 2009 the District court convicted 
him of aggravated tax fraud and sentenced him to 
one year's imprisonment for having violated 
section 12-1(1)(a), cf. section 12-2, of the Tax 
Assessment Act on account of the above-
mentioned failure to declare (see paragraphs 15 
and 17 above). The High court rejected his appeal 
(see paragraph 19 above), as did the Supreme 
court on 27 November 2010 (see paragraphs 20 
to 30 above).
(α) Whether the imposition of tax penalties 
was criminal in nature
136.  In line with its conclusion at paragraph 
107 above, the court will examine whether the 
proceedings relating to the imposition of the 30% 
tax penalty could be considered ‘criminal’ for the 
purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, on the 
basis of the Engel criteria.
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137.  In this regard, the court notes that the 
Supreme court has been attentive to the 
progressive developments of the convention law 
in this domain and has endeavoured to integrate 
the court's case-law developments into its own 
rulings on national tax legislation (see paragraphs 
44–47 above). Thus, in 2002 the Supreme court 
for the first time declared that liability for a 30% 
tax penalty constituted a ‘criminal charge’ in the 
sense of Article 6 of the convention. The Supreme 
court also held, contrary to previous rulings, that 
a 60% tax penalty was a criminal matter for the 
purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 and in 
2004 and 2006 it went on to hold that the same 
applied to the 30% tax penalty.
138.  In comparable cases concerning Sweden 
(involving tax penalties at rates of 40% and 20%), 
the court has held that the proceedings in 
question were ‘criminal’, not only for the 
purposes of Article 6 of the convention (see 
Janosevic/Sweden, 34619/97, §§ 68–71, EcHR 
2002-VII; and Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic/
Sweden, 36985/97, §§ 79–82, 23 July 2002), but 
also for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 
(see Manasson /Sweden (dec.), 41265/98, 8 April 
2003; Rosenquist, cited above; Synnelius and 
Edsbergs Taxi AB/Sweden (dec.), 44298/02, 17 June 
2008; Carlberg/Sweden (dec.), 9631/04, 27 
January 2009; and Lucky Dev, cited above, §§ 6 
and 51).
139.  Against this background, the court sees 
no cause for calling into question the finding made 
by the Supreme court (see paragraphs 22–25 
above) to the effect that the proceedings in which 
the ordinary tax penalty — at the level of 30% — 
was imposed on the first applicant concerned a 
‘criminal’ matter within the autonomous meaning 
of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
(β) Whether the criminal offences for which 
the first applicant was prosecuted were the same 
as those for which the tax penalties were imposed 
on him (idem)
140.  As stated above (at paragraph 128), the 
protection of the ne bis in idem principle is not 
dependent on the order in which the respective 
proceedings are conducted; it is the relationship 
between the two offences which is material (see 
Franz Fische/. Austria, 37950/97, § 29, 29 May 
2001; and also Storbråten; Mjelde; Haarvig; 
Ruotsalainen; and Kapetanios and Others, all cited 
above).
141.  Applying the harmonised approach in 
Zolotukhin (cited above, §§ 82–84) to the facts of 
the present case, the Supreme court found that 
the factual circumstances that constituted the 
basis for the tax penalty and the criminal 
conviction — in that both concerned the omission 
to provide certain information about income on 
the tax return — were sufficiently similar as to 
meet the above-mentioned requirement (see 
paragraph 21 above). This point is not disputed 
between the parties and, despite the additional 
factual element of fraud present in the criminal 
offence, the court sees no reason to consider 
finding otherwise.
(γ) Whether there was a final decision
142.  As to the issue of whether in the 
proceedings concerning the tax penalty there 
had been a ‘final’ decision that could potentially 
bar criminal proceedings (see Zolotukhin, cited 
above, §§ 107–108), the court refers to its analysis 
above. Being satisfied, on the assessment carried 
out below, that there was a sufficient connection 
in substance and in time between the tax 
proceedings and the criminal proceedings for 
them to be regarded as forming an integrated 
legal response to the first applicant's conduct, the 
court does not find it necessary to go further into 
the issue of the finality of the tax proceedings 
considered separately. In its view, the 
circumstance that the first set became ‘final’ 
before the second does not affect the assessment 
given below of the relationship between them 
(see paragraph 126 above).
143.  Thus, the court sees no need to express 
any view with regard to the Supreme court's 
examination of the question whether the first 
decision of 24 November 2008 became final after 
the expiry of the three week time-limit for 
lodging an administrative appeal or after that of 
the six month time-limit for lodging a judicial 
appeal (see paragraph 27 above).
(δ) Whether there was duplication of 
proceedings (bis)
144.  The competent national authorities 
found that the first applicant's reprehensible 
conduct called for two responses, an 
administrative penalty under chapter 10 on Tax 
Penalties of the Tax Assessment Act and a 
criminal one under chapter 12 on Punishment of 
the same Act (see paragraphs 15, 16 and 41–43 
above), each pursuing different purposes. As the 
Supreme court explained in its judgments of 
May 2002 (see paragraph 46 above), the 
administrative penalty of a tax surcharge served 
as a general deterrent, as a reaction to a taxpayer's 
having provided, perhaps innocently, incorrect or 
incomplete returns or information, and to 
compensate for the considerable work and costs 
incurred by the tax authorities on behalf of the 
community in carrying out checks and audits in 
order to identify such defective declarations; it 
was concerned that those costs should to a 
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certain extent be borne by those who had 
provided incomplete or incorrect information. 
Tax assessment was a mass operation involving 
millions of citizens. For the Supreme court, the 
purpose of ordinary tax penalties was first and 
foremost to enhance the effectiveness of the 
taxpayer's duty to provide complete and correct 
information and to secure the foundations of the 
national tax system, a precondition for a 
functioning State and thus a functioning society. 
criminal conviction under chapter 12, on the 
other hand, so the Supreme court stated, served 
not only as a deterrent but also had a punitive 
purpose in respect of the same anti-social 
omission, involving the additional element of the 
commission of culpable fraud.
145.  Thus, following a tax audit carried out in 
2005, the tax authorities filed a criminal 
complaint against the first applicant along with 
others in the autumn of 2007 (see paragraph 13 
above). In December 2007 he was interviewed as 
an accused and was held in custody for four days 
(see paragraph 14 above). With reference, inter 
alia, to the criminal investigation, in August 2008 
the tax authorities warned him that they would 
amend his tax assessment, including in respect of 
the year 2002, on the ground that he had omitted 
to declare NOK 3,259,341. That warning was 
issued against the background of the tax audit 
conducted by the tax authorities at Software 
Innovation AS, the ensuing criminal investigation 
and the evidence given by him in those 
proceedings (see paragraph 16 above). In October 
2008 the Økokrim indicted the applicant in 
respect of the tax offences. On 24 November 
2008 the tax authorities amended his tax 
assessment and ordered him to pay the tax 
penalty at issue. The decision had regard, inter 
alia, to evidence given by the first and second 
applicants during interviews in the criminal 
investigation. A little more than two months later, 
on 2 March 2009, the District court convicted 
him of tax fraud in relation to his failure to declare 
the said amount on his tax return for 2002. The 
court regards it as particularly important that, in 
sentencing him to one year's imprisonment, the 
District court, in accordance with general 
principles of national law on criminal sentencing 
(see paragraph 50 above), had regard to the fact 
that the first applicant had already been 
significantly sanctioned by the imposition of the 
tax penalty (see paragraph 17 above; compare 
and contrast Kapetanios and Others, cited above, 
§ 66, where the administrative courts imposing 
administrative fines failed to take into account 
the applicants' acquittal in previous criminal 
proceedings relating to the same conduct; and 
also Nykänen, cited above, where there was 
found to be no sufficient connection in substance 
between the two sets of proceedings).
146.  In these circumstances, as a first 
conclusion, the court has no cause to call into 
doubt either the reasons why the Norwegian 
legislature opted to regulate the socially 
undesirable conduct of non-payment of taxes in 
an integrated dual (administrative/criminal) 
process or the reasons why the competent 
Norwegian authorities chose, in the first 
applicant's case, to deal separately with the more 
serious and socially reprehensible aspect of fraud 
in a criminal procedure rather than in the 
ordinary administrative procedure.
Secondly, the conduct of dual proceedings, 
with the possibility of different cumulated 
penalties, was foreseeable for the applicant who 
must have known from the outset that criminal 
prosecution as well as the imposition of tax 
penalties was possible, or even likely, on the facts 
of the case (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above).
Thirdly, it seems clear that, as held by the 
Supreme court, the criminal proceedings and the 
administrative proceedings were conducted in 
parallel and were interconnected (see paragraph 
29 above). The establishment of facts made in 
one set was used in the other set and, as regards 
the proportionality of the overall punishment 
inflicted, the sentence imposed in the criminal 
trial had regard to the tax penalty (see paragraph 
17 above).
147.  On the facts before it, the court finds no 
indication that the first applicant suffered any 
disproportionate prejudice or injustice as a result 
of the impugned integrated legal response to his 
failure to declare income and pay taxes. 
consequently, having regard to the considerations 
set out above (in particular as summarised in 
paragraphs 132–134), the court is satisfied that, 
whilst different sanctions were imposed by two 
different authorities in different proceedings, 
there was nevertheless a sufficiently close 
connection between them, both in substance and 
in time, to consider them as forming part of an 
integral scheme of sanctions under Norwegian 
law for failure to provide information about 
certain income on a tax return, with the resulting 
deficiency in the tax assessment (see paragraph 
21 above).
(ii) The second applicant
In the case of the second applicant, the High 
court, relying on the same approach as that 
followed by the Supreme court in the first 
applicant's case, found, firstly, that the tax 
authorities' decision of 5 December 2008 
ordering him to pay a tax penalty of 30% did 
amount to the imposition of a ‘criminal’ 
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punishment within the meaning of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7; secondly, that the decision had 
become ‘final’ upon the expiry of the time-limit 
for lodging an appeal on 26 December 2008; and, 
thirdly, that the decision on the tax penalty and 
the subsequent criminal conviction concerned 
the same matter (see paragraph 37 above). The 
court, as in the case of the first applicant, sees no 
reason to arrive at a different conclusion on the 
first and the third matter, nor any need to 
pronounce a view on the second.
149.  As to the further question whether there 
was a duplication of proceedings (bis) that was 
incompatible with the Protocol, the court notes 
that the competent authorities, as for the first 
applicant (see paragraph 144 above), judged that 
dual proceedings were warranted in the second 
applicant's case.
150.  As to the details of the relevant 
proceedings, following their tax audit in 2005 
the tax authorities filed a criminal complaint 
with Økokrim in the autumn of 2007 also 
against the second applicant (as they had done 
against the first applicant and others) in relation 
to his failure to declare NOK 4,561,881 
(approximately EuR 500,000) in income for the 
tax year 2002 (see paragraph 31 above). With 
reference in particular to the tax audit, the 
criminal evidence given by him in the relevant 
criminal investigation and documents seized by 
Økokrim in the investigation on 16 October 
2008, the Tax Administration warned him that 
it was considering amending his tax assessment 
on the ground that he had omitted to declare 
the said income and imposing a tax penalty (see 
paragraph 32 above). On 11 November 2008 the 
public prosecutor indicted the applicant on a 
charge of tax fraud in relation to his failure to 
declare the aforementioned amount, which 
represented a tax liability of NOK 1,302,526, and 
requested the city court to pass a summary 
judgment based on the second applicant's 
confession (see paragraph 33 above). The 
criminal proceedings had reached a relatively 
advanced stage by 5 December 2008 when the 
Tax Administration amended his tax assessment 
to the effect that he owed the latter amount in 
tax and ordered him to pay the tax penalty in 
question (see paragraph 32 above).
Thus, as can be seen from the foregoing, since 
as far back as the tax authorities' complaint to the 
police in the autumn of 2007 and until the 
decision to impose the tax penalty was taken on 5 
December 2008, the criminal proceedings and 
the tax proceedings had been conducted in 
parallel and were interconnected. This state of 
affairs was similar to that which obtained in the 
first applicant's case.
151.  It is true, as noted by the High court on 
appeal, that the nine-month period — from 
when the tax authorities' decision of 5 
December 2008 had become final until the 
second applicant's conviction of 30 September 
2009 by the city court — had been somewhat 
longer than the two-and-a-half-month period 
in the case of the first applicant. However, as 
also explained by the High court (see paragraph 
39 above), this was due to the fact that the 
second applicant had withdrawn his confession 
in February 2009, with the consequence that he 
had had to be indicted anew on 29 May 2009 
and an ordinary adversarial trial hearing had 
had to be scheduled (see paragraphs 34 and 35 
above). This circumstance, resulting from a 
change of stance by the second applicant, 
cannot of itself suffice to disconnect in time the 
tax proceedings and the criminal proceedings. 
In particular, the additional lapse of time before 
the criminal trial hearing cannot be considered 
disproportionate or unreasonable, having 
regard to its cause. And what remains significant 
is the fact that, as for the first applicant, the tax 
penalty was indeed taken into account by the 
city court in fixing the sentence in the criminal 
proceedings (see paragraph 35 above).
152.  Therefore, also in the second applicant's 
case, the court has no cause to call into doubt the 
reasons why the Norwegian authorities opted to 
deal with his reprehensible conduct in an 
integrated dual (administrative/criminal) process. 
The possibility of different cumulated penalties 
must have been foreseeable in the circumstances 
(see paragraphs 13 and 32 above). The criminal 
proceedings and the administrative proceedings 
were conducted largely in parallel and were 
interconnected (see paragraph 39 above). Again 
the establishment of facts made in one set was 
relied on in the other set and, as regards the 
proportionality of the overall punishment, regard 
was had to the administrative penalty in meting 
out the criminal sentence (see paragraphs 33 and 
35 above).
153.  On the facts before the court, there is no 
indication that the second applicant suffered any 
disproportionate prejudice or injustice as a result 
of the impugned integrated legal treatment of his 
failure to declare income and pay taxes. Having 
regard to the considerations set out above (in 
particular as summarised in paragraphs 132–
134), the court thus considers that there was a 
sufficiently close connection, both in substance 
and in time, between the decision on the tax 
penalties and the subsequent criminal conviction 
for them to be regarded as forming part of an 
integral scheme of sanctions under Norwegian 
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law for failure to provide information on a tax 
return leading to a deficient tax assessment.
(iii) Overall conclusion
154.  Against this background, it cannot be 
said that either of the applicants was ‘tried or 
punished again … for an offence for which he had 
already been finally … convicted’ in breach of 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. The court accordingly 
finds no violation of this provision in the present 
case in respect of either of the two applicants.
for these reasons, the court
1. Declares, unanimously, the applications 
admissible;
2. Holds, by sixteen votes to one, that there 
has been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 
to the convention in respect of either of the 
applicants.
Noot
1. De hier opgenomen Straatsburgse uit-
spraak lijkt op het eerste gezicht nieuw licht te 
doen schijnen op het leerstuk van het verbod van 
bis in idem als het gaat om de samenloop van 
(bestraffende) bestuurlijke sancties en strafrech-
telijke sancties vanwege hetzelfde feit. De twee 
eveneens opgenomen Afdelingsuitspraken AB 
2017/190 en 191 betreffen de samenloop tussen 
(ingrijpende) herstelsancties (de intrekking van 
een marktvergunning) en een bestuurlijke boete. 
Reden om deze uitspraken hier gezamenlijk te 
annoteren is gelegen in het feit dat in alle uitspra-
ken de crux is dat het totale sanctiepakket (onge-
acht het reparatoire dan wel punitieve karakter) 
evenredig moet zijn. En met deze evenredigheid 
en het thema handhaving raken we tegelijkertijd 
de kern van het wetenschappelijk oeuvre van Lex 
Michiels, aan wie dit themanummer van de AB is 
gewijd ter gelegenheid van zijn afscheid als hoog-
leraar staats- en bestuursrecht aan Tilburg uni-
versity (vgl. F.c.M.A. Michiels & B.W.N. de Waard, 
Rechterlijke toetsing van bestuurlijke punitieve 
sancties, Den Haag, 2007). De opgenomen uit-
spraken illustreren tevens een tendens in de Ne-
derlandse bestuursrechtspraak om rekening te 
houden met de evenredigheid van het totaal aan 
sancties in één geval, waarbij als het even kan ook 
wordt gelet op de afdoening in het strafrechtelijk 
traject. In deze noot gaan we eerst kort in op de 
Straatsburgse zaak A. en B., mede in het licht van 
de als baanbrekend beschouwde uitspraak inza-
ke Zolotukhin (EHRM 10 februari 2009, AB 
2009/309, m.nt. Barkhuysen en Van Emmerik), 
zonder overigens op alle finesses van het leerstuk 
van ne bis in idem in te gaan. Vervolgens bespre-
ken wij kort de opgenomen Afdelingsuitspraken 
in het licht van enige andere recente uitspraken 
waarin de samenloop van diverse sancties cen-
traal staat. 
2. Eerst iets over de achtergrond van het 
beginsel van ne bis in idem. Op basis daarvan 
mag voor eenzelfde overtreding niet twee keer 
een bestuurlijke boete of andere bestraffende 
sanctie worden opgelegd. Voor bestuurlijke sanc-
ties is dit beginsel voor Nederland nog niet inter-
nationaal vastgelegd, zij het dat art. 50 Eu Grond-
rechtenhandvest dit wel doet maar dat geldt 
alleen wanneer lidstaten Eu-recht ten uitvoer 
leggen. Dit beginsel, dat niet wordt gegarandeerd 
door art. 6 EVRM, is immers vastgelegd in het niet 
door Nederland geratificeerde Zevende Protocol 
bij het EVRM. Verder heeft Nederland een voor-
behoud gemaakt bij de vergelijkbare garantie in 
art. 14 lid 7 IVBPR, in die zin dat wordt aangeslo-
ten bij de beperkte strekking van art. 68 Wetboek 
van Strafrecht (‘…kan niemand andermaal wor-
den vervolgd wegens een feit waarover te zijnen 
aanzien bij gewijsde van de rechter (…) onher-
roepelijk is beslist.’). Dit neemt echter niet weg 
dat dit beginsel in het algemeen ook voor be-
stuurlijke boetes wordt erkend en ook in art. 5:43 
Awb is opgenomen, zij het dat deze bepaling voor 
die gevallen alleen een verbod van dubbele be-
stuurlijke beboeting bevat. Bovendien bevat deze 
wet ook een gedetailleerde regeling voor de ver-
houding met het strafrecht, in de zin dat uiteinde-
lijk één weg moet worden gekozen (una via, art. 
5:44 Awb; zie daarover de recente conclusie van 
A-G Keus, EcLI:NL:cBB:2017:130). Daarbij heeft 
de Hoge Raad mede onder verwijzing naar de ge-
noemde bepalingen van Protocol 7 en het IVBPR 
het verbod van bis in idem als algemeen geldend 
rechtsbeginsel aangemerkt, ook buiten de be-
perkte strekking van art. 68 Sr (HR 3 maart 2015, 
AB 2015/159, m.nt. Stijnen). Hieruit volgt dat hoe-
wel het verbod van bis in idem uit Protocol 7 niet 
als zodanig geldt voor Nederland, het wel mede 
de invulling bepaalt van de wel geldende verbo-
den op dit vlak zoals hiervoor omschreven. Van-
daar ook de aandacht voor de hier opgenomen 
EHRM-uitspraak.
3. In de al genoemde zaak Zolotukhin koos 
het EHRM voor een brede, feitelijke uitleg van het 
begrip ‘hetzelfde feit’ (het ‘idem’). Art. 4 Protocol 
7 EVRM moet volgens het Hof zo worden uitge-
legd dat het de vervolging/bestraffing verbiedt 
van een tweede overtreding (‘second offence’) 
voor zover die voortvloeit uit dezelfde feiten of 
wezenlijk dezelfde feiten. Om te achterhalen of 
daarvan sprake is moet de aandacht met name 
worden gericht op die feiten ‘which constitute a 
set of concrete factual circumstances involving 
the same defendant and inextricably linked to-
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gether in time and space, the existence of which 
must be demonstrated in order to secure a con-
viction or institute criminal proceedings’. Het 
moet dus gaan om samenhangende feiten die be-
wezen moeten worden gelet op de delictsom-
schrijving. Of daarvan sprake is, zou in de regel 
moeten kunnen worden afgeleid uit de eerste 
(onherroepelijke) sanctiebeslissing en het docu-
ment waarmee de tweede bestraffende procedu-
re wordt ingeleid (de Hoge Raad lijkt hier voorals-
nog niet in mee te gaan, HR 9 februari 2016, AB 
2016/351, m.nt. Saris en Van Boven). Gevolg was 
dat deze bepaling een breed bereik kreeg en va-
ker dan voorheen een sanctie blokkeerde. Vóór 
de Zolotukhin-uitspraak kon onder omstandig-
heden aan dat gevolg worden ontkomen door 
ook de juridische kwalificatie van de feiten en 
daarmee de achtergrond van de sanctionerende 
bepaling een rol te laten spelen en op basis daar-
van te concluderen dat het niet gaat om hetzelfde 
feit. Daarbij riep de uitspraak de vraag op of lid-
staten nog konden vasthouden aan langjarige 
praktijken van gecombineerde sancties, bijvoor-
beeld op het terrein van het verkeersrecht, of, zo-
als in de hier opgenomen uitspraak, het belas-
tingrecht.
4. In de uitspraak A en B/ Noorwegen wer-
den beide klagers — aandeelhouders in een on-
derneming — zowel bestuursrechtelijk als straf-
rechtelijk bestraft wegens het niet opgeven van 
verkoopwinst aan de belastingdienst. Dat het om 
hetzelfde feit (het ‘idem’) ging, stond vast, net als 
het feit dat beide sancties als ‘criminal’ zijn aan te 
merken. De rechtsvraag betrof de toelaatbaarheid 
van dubbele bestraffing daarvoor (het ‘bis’). Het 
betrof zowel een belastingboete ter hoogte van 
30% van de fiscale navordering als een door de 
strafrechter opgelegde vrijheidsstraf, waarbij 
deze laatste rekening hield met de eerder opge-
legde fiscale boete. Anders dan mogelijk ver-
wacht (zie onder meer P.J. Wattel, ‘Bis in idem’, 
NJB 2017/205, p. 239), komt het Hof tot de con-
clusie dat deze beide bestraffende sancties (voor 
de term ‘criminal’ in de zin van art. 4 Protocol 7 
wordt zoals bekend aansluiting gezocht bij de zo-
genaamde Engel-criteria uit art. 6 EVRM) voor 
hetzelfde feit naast elkaar kunnen worden opge-
legd. Daartoe moeten de beide procedures die lei-
den tot sancties een voldoende nauwe samen-
hang hebben, zowel inhoudelijk als in tijd 
(‘sufficiently closely connected in substance and 
in time’). De procedures moeten op een voldoen-
de samenhangende manier zijn gecombineerd, 
zodat zij een coherent geheel vormen. Factoren 
die hierbij een rol spelen zijn 1. of de verschillen-
de procedures complementaire doelen dienen en 
aldus niet alleen in abstracto maar ook in concre-
to verschillende aspecten van het hetzelfde ‘soci-
ale wangedrag’ adresseren; 2. of de cumulatie 
van procedures voorzienbaar is; 3. of de verschil-
lende betrokken autoriteiten samenwerken of 
overleg hebben en daarbij met name de verza-
meling van het bewijs en de beoordeling daarvan 
één keer verrichten en gebruiken in beide proce-
dures, en 4. bovenal dat het totaalpakket aan 
sancties evenredig is, dat wil zeggen dat er een 
systeem moet zijn waarin bij de oplegging van de 
tweede sanctie rekening kan worden gehouden 
met de eerst opgelegde sanctie. Het Hof lijkt al 
met al een uitweg te hebben willen vinden om 
systemen in verschillende verdragsstaten (zoals 
in Noorwegen), waarbij twee punitieve sancties 
volgen op een en dezelfde overtreding onder 
strikte voorwaarden toch in overeenstemming 
met art. 4 Protocol 7 EVRM te achten. Het lijkt er 
op dat het Hof hier een weg inslaat waartoe zij in 
het arrest Christoffer Nilsson (EHRM 13 december 
2005, AB 2006/285, m.nt. Barkhuysen en Van 
Emmerik) al een voorzichtige opening had ge-
maakt. In die zaak betreffende de intrekking van 
een rijbewijs en een strafrechtelijke veroordeling 
(die door het Hof beide als ‘criminal’ werden aan-
gemerkt) wegens dronken rijden, oordeelde het 
Hof dat er tussen beide procedures een voldoen-
de nauwe band bestond, zowel inhoudelijk als 
temporeel, zodat er geen schending was van art. 
4 Protocol 7. Een vergelijkbare benadering is te 
zien in de meer recente rijbewijszaak Rivard/ 
Zwitserland (EHRM 4 oktober 2016, klacht no. 
21563/12). Hiermee lijkt het er op dat het Hof 
juist op de terreinen van zogenaamde ‘soft core 
criminal law’ (vgl. EHRM 23 november 2006, Jus-
sila/ Finland, AB 2007/51, m.nt. Barkhuysen en 
Van Emmerik), zoals verkeersrecht en belasting-
recht, de grenzen opzoekt van het onder voor-
waarden toch mogelijk maken van de oplegging 
van verschillende punitieve sancties vanwege de-
zelfde feiten. Het feit dat verschillende verdrags-
staten hebben geïntervenieerd lijkt hierbij ook 
een rol te hebben gespeeld.
Dat het Hof de voorwaarden uit A en B terecht 
streng toetst blijkt uit de recente belastingzaak 
Johannesson e.a./IJsland (EHRM 18 mei 2017, 
klacht no. 22007/11 waarin het Hof art. 4 Protocol 
7 wel geschonden acht, nu er maar een beperkte 
overlap in tijd was van de twee procedures en er 
afzonderlijke verzameling van bewijs door ver-
schillende autoriteiten had plaatsgevonden.
5. In een zeer uitvoerige en scherpe dissen-
ting opinion (hier niet opgenomen) veegt rechter 
Pinto de Albuquerque in niet mis te verstane be-
woordingen de vloer aan met de meerderheidsuit-
spraak van zijn collega’s. Hij besluit zijn afwijkende 
mening als volgt: “The Grand chamber examining 
the Sergey Zolotukhin case would not have agreed 
to downgrade the inalienable individual right to ne 
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bis in idem to such a fluid, narrowly construed, in 
one word illusory, right. Me neither.” En daar zit 
geen woord Spaans bij. In minder krachtige ter-
men toont annotator Haas zich ook teleurgesteld 
over de uitspraak, terwijl Van Bockel een meer 
genuanceerde benadering ten beste geeft (vind-
plaatsen hierna). Iedereen lijkt het er wel over 
eens dat het Hof met deze uitspraak ruimte laat 
aan de verdragsstaten om de genoemde gevestig-
de praktijken van dubbele bestraffing, zeker bui-
ten het klassieke strafrecht, onder strikte voor-
waarden EVRM-conform te achten. Daarbij valt 
op dat het Hof in het kader van de beoordeling of 
er sprake is van een ‘bis’ toch weer een rol laat 
spelen welke doelen met een straf worden nage-
streefd (zie de hiervoor genoemde factor 1) en 
daarmee hoe de feiten juridisch te kwalificeren, 
een lijn waarvan in het kader van de beoordeling 
van het ‘idem’ in de Zolothukin-uitspraak juist af-
scheid is genomen door feitelijk gedrag centraal 
te stellen (vgl. ook Wattel 2017). Gevolg van dit al-
les is dat een toch al ingewikkeld leerstuk nog een 
tandje lastiger is geworden. Daaraan draagt ver-
der bij de verhouding met art. 50 Eu Grondrech-
tenhandvest waar nu de vraag aan de orde is of 
het HvJ Eu de Straatsburgse lijn gaat volgen. 
6. Heeft dit gevolgen voor het bestuurs-
rechtelijk sanctierecht? Niet direct. Wanneer ech-
ter de Nederlandse rechter voor zijn interpretatie 
van wat een dubbele bestraffing is — onverplicht, 
omdat hij gelet op art. 53 EVRM ook meer rechts-
bescherming zou mogen bieden — zou aanslui-
ten bij de ‘pakket-benadering’ van het EHRM in 
de hier opgenomen uitspraak, zou dat anders 
kunnen worden. Dat geldt ook wanneer het HvJ 
Eu dat bij de toepassing van art. 50 Eu Grond-
rechtenhandvest zou doen. In dat laatste geval 
zou immers de nieuwe benadering ook gelden 
voor Nederlandse autoriteiten als zij unierecht 
ten uitvoer brengen. Een belangrijke waarborg 
voor betrokkenen blijft echter hoe dan ook de 
vierde eis die het EHRM formuleert, namelijk dat 
het totaalpakket aan sancties evenredig moet zijn 
en dat dit ook getoetst moet kunnen worden (bij 
de oplegging van de tweede sanctie).
7. In de twee in deze AB-aflevering opgeno-
men uitspraken over de toelaatbaarheid van een 
combinatie van het opleggen van een bestuurlij-
ke boete en het intrekken van een marktvergun-
ning als reactie op het tewerkstellen van illegalen 
wordt (eveneens) vergeefs een beroep gedaan op 
het verbod van bis in idem. De Afdeling erkent 
weliswaar (net als de Hoge Raad) dat het verbod 
van bis in idem ook buiten de regeling van art. 
5:43 e.v. Awb, die alleen ziet op een combinatie 
van bestuurlijke boetes met andere bestuurlijke 
boetes of met strafvervolging, geldt als algemeen 
rechtsbeginsel. Maar vervolgens komt zij tot de 
conclusie dat dit verbod niet wordt overtreden 
omdat de intrekking niet een bestraffende (‘cri-
minal’) sanctie zou zijn (vgl. voor een analyse van 
de jurisprudentie op dit punt Michiels, Blomberg 
& Jurgens, Handhavingsrecht, Deventer, 2016, 
hoofdstuk 5; B. de Kam, De intrekking van be-
schikkingen mede in Europees en rechtsvergelij-
kend perspectief (diss. Nijmegen), Deventer, 2016). 
Tegelijk wordt betrokkenen wel rechts-
bescherming geboden via toetsing van de intrek-
kingssanctie aan het evenredigheidsvereiste van 
3:4 lid 2 Awb. Niet expliciet duidelijk wordt of 
daarbij ook mee is gewogen het feit dat ook al een 
forse boete is opgelegd. Dat zou naar ons oordeel 
wel voor de hand liggen.
8. In recente bestuursrechtelijke en straf-
rechtelijke jurisprudentie zijn ook voorbeelden te 
vinden van uitspraken waarin als eis wordt ge-
steld dat het totale sanctiepakket (ook los van de 
vraag of sprake is van bis in idem) evenredig is. Zo 
houdt de centrale Raad van Beroep bij de bepa-
ling van de hoogte van een bestuurlijke boete we-
gens schending van de inlichtingenplicht op 
grond van de Wet Werk en Bijstand rekening met 
een strafbeschikking op grond van de Opiumwet 
(beide sancties volgden op de aanwezigheid van 
een hennepkwekerij, cRvB 22 november 2016, 
EcLI:NL:cRVB:2016:4606) en oordeelt het Hof 
Den Bosch de strafvervolging van een verdachte 
terzake van het verrichten van taxivervoer zon-
der vergunning in strijd met de beginselen van 
een goede procesorde, nu hij op grond van dat-
zelfde feit reeds een forse dwangsom heeft ver-
beurd (Hof ’s Hertogenbosch 2 februari 2017, 
EcLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:349). Ook de Hoge Raad 
heeft recent een arrest gewezen inzake de samen-
loop van de zogenaamde (op het Eu-recht ge-
gronde) randvoorwaardenkorting in het econo-
misch bestuursrecht en een strafrechtelijke boete. 
De Hoge Raad concludeert weliswaar dat het hier 
niet gaat om twee punitieve sancties en daarmee 
ook niet om een schending van het ne bis in idem 
beginsel. Wel overweegt hij ten overvloede dat 
het totale sanctiepakket evenredig moet zijn (HR 
14 februari 2017, EcLI:NL:HR:2017:241). Het laat-
ste woord zal zeker niet gezegd zijn als het gaat 
om de samenloop van sancties. Waar het om gaat 
in deze bestuursrechtelijke en strafrechtelijke ju-
risprudentie is dat de rechter die in laatste instan-
tie aan zet is, de evenredigheid van het totaalpak-
ket aan sancties garandeert. En daarmee is Lex 
Michiels weer in beeld, ditmaal als lid van de Af-
deling bestuursrechtspraak.
9. De EHRM-uitspraak inzake A en B is ook 
gepubliceerd in EHRC 2017/61, m.nt. Van Bockel 
en BNB 2017/14, m.nt. Haas.
T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik
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